Whenever the General Assembly is directed or authorized by this Constitution to enact general laws, or general laws uniformly applicable throughout the State, or general laws uniformly applicable in every county, city and town, and other unit of local government, or in every local court district, no special or local act shall be enacted concerning the subject matter directed or authorized to be accomplished by general or uniformly applicable laws, and every amendment or repeal of any law relating to such subject matter shall also be general and uniform in its effect throughout the State. General laws may be enacted for classes defined by population or other criteria. General laws uniformly applicable throughout the State shall be made applicable without classification or exception in every unit of local government of like kind, such as every county, or every city and town, but need not be made applicable in every unit of local government in the State. General laws uniformly applicable in every county, city and town, and other unit of local government, or in every local court district, shall be made applicable without classification or exception in every unit of local government, or in every local court district, as the case may be. The General Assembly may at any time repeal any special, local, or private act.
(1969, c. 1200, s. 1.)
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. IV, § 20, Const. 1868, as that article was rewritten in 1962.
Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Town of Emerald Isle v. State of North Carolina: A New Test for Distinguishing Between General Laws and Local Legislation," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 1096 (1988).
CASE NOTES
What Is a General Law. - A general law defines a class which reasonably warrants special legislative attention and applies uniformly to everyone in the class. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
A law is general if any rational basis reasonably related to the objective of the legislation can be identified which justifies the separation of units of local government into included and excluded categories. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
What Is a Local Act. - A local act unreasonably singles out a class for special legislative attention or, having made a reasonable classification, does not apply uniformly to all members of the designated class. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
The constitutional prohibition against local acts simply commands that when legislating in certain specified fields the General Assembly must make rational distinctions among units of local government which are reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
Distinguishing Between General and Local Acts. - The distinguishing factors between a valid general law and a prohibited local act are the related elements of reasonable classification and uniform application. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
The mere fact that a statute applies only to certain units of local government does not by itself render the statute a prohibited local act. Only if the statutory classification is unreasonable or under-inclusive will the statute be voided as a prohibited local act. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
Classification does not render a statute "local" if the classification is reasonable and based on rational difference of situation and condition. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
Regulation Need Not Reach Every Conceivable Class. - There is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must reach every class to which it might be applied, i.e., that the legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. It is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil where it is felt, and reaches the class of cases where it most frequently occurs. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
While substantial distinctions are essential in classification, the distinctions need not be scientific or exact. The legislature has wide discretion in making classifications. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
Coastal Area Management Act Upheld. - The Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 (G.S. 113A-100 et seq.) is a general law which the General Assembly had power to enact. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
Act Reviving a Town Charter. - An Act purporting to revive a town did not violate this provision because the constitution did not direct the General Assembly to create municipalities by general laws. Bethania Town Lot Comm. v. City of Winston-Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998).
Dual Office Holding in Local Law Prohibited. - Chapter 129 of Session Laws 1983, insofar as it provides for dual office holding in a local law, is unconstitutional. Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 663 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
The purpose of Session Laws 1983, Chapter 539 was to establish pedestrian beach access facilities for general public use in the vicinity of Bogue Inlet, and it was a general law, not a local act. Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987).
Applied in Chem-Security Sys. v. Morrow, 61 N.C. App. 147, 300 S.E.2d 393 (1983); In re City of Durham Annexation Ordinance Numbered 5991 for Area A, 69 N.C. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 649 (1984); Floyd v. Lumberton City Bd. of Educ., 71 N.C. App. 670, 324 S.E.2d 18 (1984).
Cited in Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 78 N.C. App. 736, 338 S.E.2d 581 (1986); Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262 (1988); Clark v. Craven Regional Medical Auth., 326 N.C. 15, 387 S.E.2d 168 (1990); Helton v. Good, 208 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D.N.C. 2002).