The following persons shall be disqualified for office:
First, any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.
Second, with respect to any office that is filled by election by the people, any person who is not qualified to vote in an election for that office.
Third, any person who has been adjudged guilty of treason or any other felony against this State or the United States, or any person who has been adjudged guilty of a felony in another state that also would be a felony if it had been committed in this State, or any person who has been adjudged guilty of corruption or malpractice in any office, or any person who has been removed by impeachment from any office, and who has not been restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed by law.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. VI, § 8, Const. 1868, as that article was rewritten in 1900.
Legal Periodicals. - For essay, "Something There Is That Doesn't Love a Wall: Reflections on the History of North Carolina's Religious Test for Public Office," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1071 (1986).
CASE NOTES
"Adjudged" Defined. - The word "adjudged" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers." In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
"Guilty" Defined. - The word "guilty" connotes evil, intentional wrongdoing and refers to conscious and culpable acts; it does not necessarily mean or require criminal conviction or the finding of a jury. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
The definitions of "adjudged" and "guilty" are broad enough to encompass an adjudication by the Supreme Court, pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 7A-376, that a judge is guilty of willful misconduct in office. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Criminal Conviction Unnecessary for Disqualification. - Substitution in this section of the term "adjudged guilty" for the term "convicted" permits the General Assembly to prescribe proceedings in addition to criminal trials in which an adjudication of guilt will result in disqualification from office. Pursuant to that authorization, the legislature enacted G.S. 7A-376, barring a judge from future judicial office when he has been removed by this court for willful misconduct in office. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Adjudication of "Willful Misconduct in Office" Equivalent to "Malpractice in Any Office" for Removal Purposes. - An adjudication of "willful misconduct in office" by the Supreme Court in a proceeding instituted by the Judicial Standards Commission in which the judge or justice involved has been accorded due process of law and his guilt established by "clear and convincing evidence" is equivalent to an adjudication of guilt of "malpractice in any office" as used in this section. Therefore, the legislature acted within its power when it made disqualification from judicial office a consequence of removal for willful misconduct under G.S. 7A-376. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Disqualification Not Part of Judgment. - Disqualification from office and loss of the right of suffrage, imposed by this section upon persons convicted of infamous offenses, constitute no part of the judgment of the court, but are mere consequences of such judgment. State v. Jones, 82 N.C. 685 (1880), decided under former Art. VI, § 8, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1900.
Additional Disqualifications. - The wording of this section does not necessarily imply that additional disqualifications cannot be added by the General Assembly for those persons not elected by the people. Instead this section merely enumerates three disqualifications, one of which applies only to offices filled by election by the people. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).
Removal of Prosecuting Attorney. - A prosecuting attorney is removable from office as a matter of law or legal inference upon findings of his willful misconduct or maladministration in office, supported by evidence. State ex rel. Hyatt v. Hamme, 180 N.C. 684, 104 S.E. 174 (1920), decided under former Art. VI, § 8, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1900.
Appeal from Judgment that Prosecuting Attorney Be Removed. - An appeal from judgment of superior court judge that a prosecuting attorney be removed for "willful misconduct or maladministration in office," etc., is upon questions of law and legal inference, if justified by the findings of fact supported by evidence. State ex rel. Hyatt v. Hamme, 180 N.C. 684, 104 S.E. 174 (1920), decided under former Art. VI, § 8, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1900.
Cited in Brooks v. Edwards, 396 F. Supp. 662 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Broughton v. North Carolina, 717 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1990).
Opinions of Attorney General
Requirement That Applicant for Office Admit Existence of God Violates U.S. Const., Amend. I. - See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Clyde Smith, Deputy Secretary of State, 41 N.C.A.G. 727 (1972).
Nolo Contendere Plea Brings No Forfeiture of Rights. - At least under the wording of N.C. Const., Art. VI, § 2, a plea of nolo contendere or "no contest" to a felony charge would not result in the forfeiture of any rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. See opinion of Attorney General to Ms. Bessie J. Cherry, Clerk of Court, Washington, North Carolina, 49 N.C.A.G. 134 (1980).