(1) Residence period for State elections. Any person who has resided in the State of North Carolina for one year and in the precinct, ward, or other election district for 30 days next preceding an election, and possesses the other qualifications set out in this Article, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in this State. Removal from one precinct, ward, or other election district to another in this State shall not operate to deprive any person of the right to vote in the precinct, ward, or other election district from which that person has removed until 30 days after the removal.
(2) Residence period for presidential elections. The General Assembly may reduce the time of residence for persons voting in presidential elections. A person made eligible by reason of a reduction in time of residence shall possess the other qualifications set out in this Article, shall only be entitled to vote for President and Vice President of the United States or for electors for President and Vice President, and shall not thereby become eligible to hold office in this State.
(3) Disqualification of felon. No person adjudged guilty of a felony against this State or the United States, or adjudged guilty of a felony in another state that also would be a felony if it had been committed in this State, shall be permitted to vote unless that person shall be first restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed by law.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. VI, § 2, Const. 1868, as added in 1900 and amended in 1920, 1954 and 1962.
Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "State Durational Residence Requirements as a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause," see 3 N.C. Cent. L.J. 233 (1972).
For survey of 1972 case law on student suffrage, see 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1060 (1973).
CASE NOTES
Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former Art. VI, § 2, Const. 1868, as amended.
One-Year Residency Requirement Invalid As Applied to Local Elections. - The one-year durational residency requirement, as it relates to the right to vote in local elections, is unconstitutional and invalid, as violative of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1034, 92 S. Ct. 1306, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972).
Denial of right to vote to convicted felon is not cruel and unusual punishment. Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961, 93 S. Ct. 2151, 36 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1973).
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 2, Expressly Allows Exclusion of Felons. - A State may constitutionally continue the "historic exclusion" of felons from the franchise without regard to whether such exclusion can pass muster under the equal protection clause, because U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 2, expressly allows the exclusion of felons from the franchise without reduction of representation. Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961, 93 S. Ct. 2151, 36 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1973).
Provisions in State statutes and constitutions which deny convicted felons the right to vote and hold office do not violate the various rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Wilson v. Goodwyn, 522 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
"Residence" Defined. - Residence, as used in this section, is synonymous with domicile, denoting a permanent dwelling place to which the party, when absent, intends to return. State ex rel. Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115 (1883); State ex rel. Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12, petition for rehearing denied, 229 N.C. 797, 48 S.E.2d 37 (1948); Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954).
"Residence," within the purview of this provision, is synonymous with domicile, and as used in the North Carolina Constitution of 1970 continues to mean domicile. Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972).
Duration of Residence. - A person, in order to become a qualified elector in this State, must have come into the State a year before the election, or have been domiciled within it for 12 months after forming the purpose to remain, and the same intent must be concurrent with the actual occupation of a domicile in the county in order to entitle him to the rights of an elector within its limits. People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, 11 S.E. 665 (1890).
Residence Must Be of Permanent Character. - In order to acquire a residence for the purpose of exercising the right to vote in a given locality, the "residence" must be of a permanent and not of a temporary character, corresponding with the word domicile. State ex rel. Gower v. Carter, 195 N.C. 697, 143 S.E. 513 (1928).
General Assembly Cannot Increase Length of Residence Requirement. - The General Assembly cannot in any way change the qualifications of voters in State, county, township, city or town elections; thus, an act which requires a longer residence in the county than this section requires is unconstitutional. People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198 (1875).
Qualifications for Municipal Election. - The qualifications of voters in a municipal election are the same as in a general one. State ex rel. Gower v. Carter, 194 N.C. 293, 139 S.E. 604 (1927).
Cities and towns, like counties and townships, are parts and parcels of the State, organized for the convenience of local self-government; and the qualifications of voters are the same. People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198 (1875).
Limitations on Voting Imposed by Municipality. - A provision in the charter of a municipality limiting the right of suffrage in municipal elections to owners of real property within the town is unconstitutional. Smith v. Town of Carolina Beach, 206 N.C. 834, 175 S.E. 313 (1934).
A provision in a town charter permitting nonresident freeholders to vote in all municipal elections is void because in conflict with this section. However, an election held under this provision is not void if it is shown that no persons not qualified under the Constitution actually participated in the election. Wrenn v. Town of Kure Beach, 235 N.C. 292, 69 S.E.2d 492 (1952).
This constitutional provision applies primarily to an incoming person, who is not permitted to exercise political rights until after he has been in the State and the voting precinct for the prescribed periods. State ex rel. Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12, petition for rehearing denied, 229 N.C. 797, 48 S.E.2d 37 (1948).
And Not to a Citizen of this State Who Is Temporarily Absent. - This constitutional provision is not designed to disfranchise a citizen of the State when he leaves his home and goes into another state or into another county of this State for temporary purposes with the intention of retaining his home and of returning to it when the objects which call him away are attained. State ex rel. Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12, petition for rehearing denied, 229 N.C. 797, 48 S.E.2d 37 (1948).
Where a voter was in the service of the federal government at Washington, D.C., but continued to pay poll tax and vote in Halifax County, and spent a part of each year at his home in Halifax, his constitutional residence remained unchanged in Halifax. Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954).
Protracted Residence Abroad. - A protracted residence abroad of one engaged in business and with no home in this State is not consistent with the idea of residence here. State ex rel. Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115 (1883).
Residence Near Precinct Line. - When a voter resides on or so near the precinct line, or where the line is so uncertain, that it is doubtful in which precinct the voter lives, and the voter, honestly and in good faith, bona fide registers and votes in the precinct he, in good faith, alleges and believes he lives in, and has good reason to believe he is correct, and registers and votes in no other precinct, such vote is legal. People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, 11 S.E. 665 (1890).
Failure to Administer Oath to Electors. - The mere failure of the registrars (now chief judges) to administer the oath to the electors, and allowing them to vote where not challenged, will not affect the result of the election held for the establishment of a special road district under valid legislative authority, when the electors so voting are qualified. Woodall v. Western Wake Hwy. Comm'n, 176 N.C. 377, 97 S.E. 226 (1918).
Vote by Convicted Criminal. - In a contested election case, conviction of an offense under a local law prescribing punishment in the State's prison renders void the vote of the one so convicted, whether the indictment charged or failed to charge that the alleged offense was "feloniously" committed. State ex rel. Robertson v. Jackson, 183 N.C. 695, 110 S.E. 593 (1922).
Vote of Escaped Prisoner. - If a person in jail for a misdemeanor (not infamous), and sentenced to imprisonment, escapes, and before he is recaptured his term or sentence expires, and he votes in his own precinct, in which he resided before he was sentenced, such vote is valid if the voter is otherwise qualified; but if the voter is a fugitive from justice, and is in hiding from one part of the county to another, and voted in the precinct he happened to be in, and not in the precinct of his residence when sentenced, such vote is illegal. People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, 11 S.E. 665 (1890).
Cited in United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1990); Farnsworth v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182, 441 S.E.2d 597 (1994); James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 607 S.E.2d 638 (2005).
Opinions of Attorney General
Nolo Contendere Plea Brings No Forfeiture of Rights. - At least under the wording of N.C. Const., Art. VI, § 2, a plea of nolo contendere or "no contest" to a felony charge would not result in the forfeiture of any rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. See opinion of Attorney General to Ms. Bessie J. Cherry, Clerk of Court, Washington, North Carolina, 49 N.C.A.G. 134 (1980).