(1) General and uniform system: term. The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.
(2) Local responsibility. The General Assembly may assign to units of local government such responsibility for the financial support of the free public schools as it may deem appropriate. The governing boards of units of local government with financial responsibility for public education may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program.
Cross References. - As to establishment of a uniform school system, see G.S. 115C-1.
History Note. - The provisions of subsection (1) of this section are similar to those of Art. IX, § 2, Const. 1868, as amended by the Convention of 1875. Subsection (2) of this section corresponds to Art. IX, § 3, Const. 1868. That section, as amended in 1918, provided that each county should be divided into districts, in which one or more public schools should be maintained at least six months in every year, and made county commissioners liable to indictment for failure to comply with the section.
Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).
For survey of 1980 constitutional law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1116 (1981).
For survey of 1981 constitutional law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1272 (1982).
For note, "State v. Whittle Communications: Allowing Local School Boards to Turn on 'Channel One'," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1929 (1992).
For a survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2252 (1997).
For note on Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997), annotated under this section, see 76 N.C.L. Rev. 1481 (1998).
For article, "Leandro v. State and the Constitutional Limitation on School Suspensions and Expulsions in North Carolina" see 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1507 (2005).
CASE NOTES
Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former Art. IX, §§ 2 and 3, Const. 1868, before and after amendment.
Public School System Established. - The Constitution establishes the public school system, and the General Assembly provides for it, by its own taxing power, and by the taxing power of the counties, and the State Board of Education, by the aid of school committees, manages it. It is to be a "system," it is to be "general," and it is to be "uniform." It is not to be subject to the caprices of localities, but every locality, yea, every child, is to have the same advantage and be subject to the same rules and regulations. Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153 (1871).
This section contemplates that the General Assembly shall provide a State system of public schools to the end that every child, without regard to the county in which such child resides, shall have an opportunity to attend a school in which standards set up by the State are maintained and wherein tuition shall be free of charge. Marshburn v. Brown, 210 N.C. 331, 186 S.E. 265 (1936); Constantian v. Anson County, 244 N.C. 221, 93 S.E.2d 163 (1956).
The provisions of this section and of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 15, with the activating statutes, embody mandates for the establishment of free public schools in North Carolina, the untrammeled privilege of education for all students, and the duty of the State to maintain and guard that right, while guaranteeing equal opportunities to all students. Webster v. Perry, 512 F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1975).
Meaning of "Uniform". - The requirement of this section that the public school system shall be uniform by legislative authority relates to the uniformity of the "system," and not to the uniformity of the class or kind of the "schools"; thus qualifying the word "system," it is sufficiently complied with where, by statute or authorized regulation of the public school authorities, provision is made for establishment of schools of like kind throughout all sections of the State and available to all of the school population of the territories contributing to their support. Board of Educ. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 N.C. 469, 93 S.E. 1001 (1917).
Intent. - By mandating equal opportunities for all students, the framers of the Constitution and the voters that adopted it were emphasizing that the days of "separate but equal" education in this State were over, and that the people of this State were committed to providing all students with equal access to full participation in public schools, regardless of race or other classification. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
Equal access to participation in the public school system is a fundamental right guaranteed by the State Constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980).
The fundamental right that is guaranteed by the Constitution is equal access to public schools; that is, every child has a fundamental right to receive an education in public schools. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
The right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education. An education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
Sound Basic Education. - Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
For purposes of our Constitution, a sound basic education will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak English and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental math and physical science to enable the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history and basic economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices regarding personal issues or issues that affect the community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education or vocational training; (4) and sufficient academic and social skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful employment. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
Substantially Equal Funding Not Required. - Although the State Constitution requires that access to a sound basic education be provided equally in every school district, the equal opportunities clause of Article IX, Section 2(1) does not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all school districts. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
The equal opportunities clause of Article IX, Section 2(1) does not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all school districts. Banks v. County of Buncombe, 128 N.C. App. 214, 494 S.E.2d 791 (1998), aff'd, 348 N.C. 687, 500 S.E.2d 666 (1998).
Creation of Supplemental Funding Programs Allowed. - Because under subsection (1) of this Section the General Assembly has the duty of providing the children of every school district with access to a sound basic education, it has inherent power to do those things reasonably related such as creating a supplemental state funding program to provide additional funds to poor districts. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
A student's right to an education may be constitutionally denied when it is outweighed by the school's interest in protecting other students, teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
As a general rule, a student may be constitutionally suspended or expelled for misconduct, whenever the conduct is of a type the school may legitimately prohibit, and procedural due process is provided. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
State Has Responsibility for Overseeing Public Schools. - Under the Constitution, the State is given responsibility for overseeing the public schools of this State in order to ensure that every student in the State receives the education to which he or she is entitled. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
This section is mandatory and may not be disregarded either by the legislature or by officials charged with the duty of administering the law. Blue v. Durham Pub. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 441 (M.D.N.C. 1951).
The provisions of this section and N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 1 of this Article are mandatory and require that the legislature provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of public education, free of charge, to all of the children of the State and for the continuance of the school term in the various districts for at least six months (now nine months) in each and every year. Lacy v. Fidelity Bank, 183 N.C. 373, 111 S.E. 612 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 171, 44 S. Ct. 280, 60 L. Ed. 623 (1924). See also, Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 145 N.C. 170, 59 S.E. 44 (1907); Mebane Graded Sch. Dist. v. County of Alamance, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937).
It is the duty of the State to provide a general and uniform State system of public schools of at least six months (now nine months) in every year, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all the children of the State. It is a necessary expense, and a vote of the people is not required to make effective these and other constitutional provisions in relation to the public school system of the State. Mebane Graded Sch. Dist. v. County of Alamance, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937). See also, Fuller v. Lockhart, 209 N.C. 61, 182 S.E. 733 (1935).
The operation of the public schools as required by this Article is a "necessary expense" not requiring a vote of the electorate under N.C. Const., Art. V, §§ 2 and 4. Yoder v. Board of Comm'rs, 7 N.C. App. 712, 173 S.E.2d 529 (1970).
But Statute May Provide Mode of Performance. - This section is mandatory, but the mode of performance is prescribed by statute. City of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N.C. 165, 173 S.E. 56 (1934).
As it is a legislative function to formulate the means of carrying out the provisions of this section. Wilkinson v. Board of Educ., 199 N.C. 669, 155 S.E. 562 (1930).
Establishment of School System Is Province of Legislature. - It is the province of the General Assembly, and not of the State Board of Education, to establish a uniform system of public schools. Board of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.C. 313, 19 S.E. 277 (1894). See also, Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N.C. 472, 20 S.E.2d 825 (1942).
The establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform system of public schools is upon and exclusively within the province of the General Assembly. Moore v. Board of Educ., 212 N.C. 499, 193 S.E. 732 (1937).
The establishment and operation of the public school system is under the control of the legislative branch of the government, subject only to pertinent constitutional provisions as to uniformity and length of term. Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944).
Instructional Service and Facilities Within Constitutional Mandate. - The mandate of this Article carries with it not merely the bare necessity of instructional service, but all facilities reasonably necessary to accomplish this main purpose. Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 1 N.C. App. 258, 161 S.E.2d 213, aff'd, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968).
Maintenance of the public schools and the furnishing of those things which are reasonably essential to that end are within the mandatory provision of this Article. Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 1 N.C. App. 258, 161 S.E.2d 213, aff'd, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968).
Sites, Buildings and Equipment Necessary. - Sites, buildings, and equipment acquired, constructed, and used by a school district were deemed reasonably essential and necessary for the conduct and operation of the required school term at the time the said sites, buildings, and equipment were acquired and constructed. Mebane Graded Sch. Dist. v. County of Alamance, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937).
Constitution Does Not Prohibit Charging Financially Able Persons for Supplies and Materials. - Requirement of administrative boards of certain school districts that those pupils or their parents who are financially able to do so furnish supplies and materials for the personal use of such students does not violate the mandate of subsection (1) of this section. Nor is there any constitutional impediment to the charging of modest, reasonable fees by individual school boards to support the purchase of supplementary supplies and materials for use by or on behalf of students. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980).
But fee waiver policy adopted by city board of education was unconstitutional where it failed to establish a mechanism by which the schools would affirmatively notify students and their parents of the availability of a waiver or reduction of the fee or by which the students or parents themselves might apply for a partial or complete exemption from the fee requirements, since the waiver policy did not fairly guarantee to low income and indigent students their right of equal access to the educational opportunities available at their schools and did not accord procedural due process to such students. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980).
No Maximum Limitation on School Term. - The mandatory provision of this section to the effect that one or more public schools shall be maintained at least six months (now nine months) in every year, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to children of the State, is not a limitation as to the length of the school term; it is the minimum required by the Constitution. Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968).
This section, which requires a public school system of the State to have at least six-months (now nine-months) terms in each year, leaves it to the discretionary power of the legislature to fix terms in excess of that period. Frazier v. Board of Comm'rs, 194 N.C. 49, 138 S.E. 433 (1927).
Contract for Current Affairs Video Not Unconstitutional. - A local school board's contract with the developer of a short current affairs video did not violate this section; students were not required to watch the program and therefore were not being made to pay for the contract with the time they spent watching it. State v. Whittle Communications, 328 N.C. 456, 402 S.E.2d 556 (1991).
Exit Tuition Fee for Transfer. - County Board of Education could not require the payment of an exit tuition fee as a condition to approving the transfer of a county resident student to a school system in a different county, as the exit tuition fee is not provided for by the constitution and statutes of this State. Streeter v. Greene County Bd. of Educ., 115 N.C. App. 452, 446 S.E.2d 107 (1994).
Maintenance of Day-Care Program in Elementary School. - A local school board permitting a day-care program for "latch key" children to be operated in an elementary school is not in violation of this section. Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982).
The legislature may constitutionally delegate to the school board the power or authority to maintain a day-care program. Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982).
Tuition paid by students enrolled in day-care program is not violative of this section where the tuition is for a supplemental program, not for the students' basic education. Kiddie Korner Day Schools, Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 55 N.C. App. 134, 285 S.E.2d 110 (1981), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 305 N.C. 300, 291 S.E.2d 150 (1982).
The financing of the public school system of the State is in the discretion of the General Assembly by appropriate legislation, either by State appropriation or through the county acting as an administrative agency of the State. Mebane Graded Sch. Dist. v. County of Alamance, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937).
Distribution of Funds. - All of the funds raised in the State for common school purposes should be distributed per capita among the beneficiaries and not be retained in the counties where they are raised. Board of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.C. 313, 19 S.E. 277 (1894); Board of School Comm'rs v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 169 N.C. 196, 85 S.E. 138 (1915).
In the distribution of the funds raised for common school purposes, the General Assembly may not discriminate in favor or to the prejudice of either the white or black race. Hooker v. Town of Greenville, 130 N.C. 472, 42 S.E. 141 (1902).
Action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by minors who were, or would be in the future, enrolled in public schools in the county, and their parents or legal guardians, alleging that the present statutory system of financing public schools in this State resulted in inequities in educational programs and facilities between the public schools within that county, which had a relatively low tax base from which to draw funds, and those in other counties with relatively high tax bases, and that the operation of five separate school systems in that county prohibited effective use of facilities and staff and promoted inequitable use of state and local funds, thus depriving them of equal opportunity to a free public school education in violation of subsection (1) of this section, and N.C. Const., Art. I, §§ 1, 15 and 19, failed to allege facts entitling them to relief or conferring jurisdiction on the courts of this State. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, appeal dismissed, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
Counties May Be Directed to Provide Funds. - It is within the power of the General Assembly to authorize and direct the counties of the State as administrative units or governmental agencies to provide the necessary funds by taxation or otherwise. Harrell v. Board of Comm'rs, 206 N.C. 225, 173 S.E. 614 (1934).
For Programs Proposed by Board of Education. - The General Assembly has not delegated to board of county commissioners the power to initiate and fund their own programs for the public schools; rather, county commissioners are delegated the power to fund only those school-related programs proposed by the board of education. Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86, 253 S.E.2d 898 (1979).
Counties May Act as Agents of State. - The Constitution requires the General Assembly to provide for a general and uniform system of public instruction. In fulfilling this purpose, the General Assembly may act through the agency of the county. When the county acts as agent of the State in carrying out legislative enactments, its actions fall within the authority granted by this section. Benvenue Parent-Teacher Ass'n v. Nash County Bd. of Educ., 4 N.C. App. 617, 167 S.E.2d 538, appeal dismissed, 275 N.C. 675, 170 S.E.2d 473 (1969).
A county is an administrative unit of the State in our statewide public school system, and a statute requiring a county to maintain at least a six-months (now nine-months) school term in each of its school districts and to provide the necessary funds therefor by taxation or otherwise is valid. Evans v. Mecklenburg County, 205 N.C. 560, 172 S.E. 323 (1934).
A county board of education has the constitutional obligation to correct educational disparities in school facilities between schools previously maintained for black students and schools previously maintained for white students, and to afford all students of all races in all schools equal educational opportunities. Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968).
Consolidation Upheld. - Act to consolidate existing school administrative units did not violate subdivision (1) of this section of the Constitution. Guilford County Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 430 S.E.2d 681 (1993).
Minimum funding requirement of act to consolidate existing school administrative units did not violate subsection (2) of this section. Guilford County Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 430 S.E.2d 681 (1993).
Levy of County Tax to Supplement Teachers' Salaries. - In levying an additional tax for the purpose of supplementing teachers' salaries pursuant to former G.S. 115-80(a), the board of county commissioners acted as an agency of the State under a delegation of authority from the General Assembly to carry out the duty imposed upon it by this section to maintain a system of public schools, and there was no requirement that such levy be submitted to a vote of the people. Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 1 N.C. App. 258, 161 S.E.2d 213, aff'd, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968).
Tax Levy for County School Capital Reserve Fund. - Former G.S. 115-80.1, authorizing the county board of commissioners to levy an ad valorem tax for a county school capital reserve fund to be used for the purpose of anticipating school capital outlays, was a valid exercise of legislative authority; the creation of such fund did not require a vote of the people. Yoder v. Board of Comm'rs, 7 N.C. App. 712, 173 S.E.2d 529 (1970).
As to expenditure of funds by county for operation of a technical institute for adult vocational and general educational training, see Benvenue Parent-Teacher Ass'n v. Nash County Bd. of Educ., 4 N.C. App. 617, 167 S.E.2d 538, appeal dismissed, 275 N.C. 675, 170 S.E.2d 473 (1969).
As to county's obligation in relation to tax limitation provisions of Art. V, § 1, Const. 1868, see Board of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs, 111 N.C. 578, 16 S.E. 621 (1892); Board of Educ. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 N.C. 469, 93 S.E. 1001 (1917); Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968).
Bond Issue for Student Loans. - Where bond proceeds are to be used solely to make loans to meritorious North Carolinians of slender means and to thereby minimize the number of qualified persons whose education or training is interrupted or abandoned for lack of funds, the bond proceeds are for a public purpose. State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970).
It is expected that a student loan will inure to the private benefit of the person who obtains it. It is equally true that the education provided throughout the entire school system is intended to inure to the benefit of the individual who obtains it. However, the fact that the individual obtains a private benefit cannot be considered sufficient ground to defeat the execution of the paramount public purpose of encouraging education. State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970).
Exemption of school bonds from taxation is valid. County of Mecklenburg v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 171, 185 S.E. 654 (1936).
Assumption of Indebtedness of School District. - When necessary to maintain the term of public schools required by the Constitution, it is within the legislative authority in establishing its statewide system to assume an indebtedness of a school district therefor, including the cost of necessary buildings, and direct that it be provided for by the respective counties as administrative units of the public school system of the State. Lovelace v. Pratt, 187 N.C. 686, 122 S.E. 661 (1924).
As to mandamus to compel the assumption by a county of indebtedness incurred by school districts for the erection and equipment of school buildings necessary to the constitutional school term, see City of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N.C. 165, 173 S.E. 56 (1934).
As to mandamus to compel county commissioners to maintain schools, see County Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs, 150 N.C. 116, 63 S.E. 724 (1909); City of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N.C. 165, 173 S.E. 56 (1934); Mebane Graded Sch. Dist. v. County of Alamance, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937).
As to redistricting for school purposes, see Moore v. Board of Educ., 212 N.C. 499, 193 S.E. 732 (1937).
Entitlement of Students Expelled under Former § 115-147 to Reinstatement or Equivalent. - Under the North Carolina Constitution and the implementing statute, students expelled from school pursuant to the authority of former G.S. 115-147 might be entitled to either reinstatement or to equivalent free educational opportunities in a more suitable environment. Webster v. Perry, 367 F. Supp. 666 (M.D.N.C. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 963, 94 S. Ct. 3166, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1136 (1974), modified, 512 F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1975).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Ordered to Desegregate. - See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 318 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd in part, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971).
Cited in Moore v. Wykle, 107 N.C. App. 120, 419 S.E.2d 164; Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Wilson County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 26 N.C. App. 114, 215 S.E.2d 412 (1975); Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 418 S.E.2d 648 (1992); Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., - F. Supp. 2d - (E.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2000); Royal v. State, 153 N.C. App. 495, 570 S.E.2d 738 (2002); Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 177 N.C. App. 629, 630 S.E.2d 200 (2006).
Opinions of Attorney General
As to the rights of a student to attend the school system in which he, his parents or legal guardian are domiciled, and the duty and authority of local boards of education concerning the enrollment of students who are and are not domiciled in their school systems, see opinion of Attorney General to Mr. C. Wade Mobley, Superintendent, Rowan County Schools, 55 N.C.A.G. 61 (1985).