The General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created. Appeals from administrative agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. IV, § 3, Const. 1868, as that article was rewritten in 1962.
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).
CASE NOTES
Purpose. - A major purpose of this section is to reconcile the retention of judicial power in the judicial branch required by N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 1, with the recognized need to utilize administrative expertise in implementing complicated regulatory schemes such as the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
The application of this section requires three questions be answered: (1) For what purposes was the agency created?, (2) which peculiarly "judicial" power has the General Assembly attempted to vest in the agency?, and (3) is the Legislature's grant of such judicial power reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agency was created? In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Considerations Irrelevant to Determination of Whether Judicial Power Properly Conferred. - Considerations such as the maximum size of the civil penalty and the availability of alternative enforcement sanctions are irrelevant to the question of whether a civil penalty is a peculiarly "judicial" power reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of an agency's purposes; since the judiciary does not possess the power to enact specific civil penalties or other alternative enforcement sanctions, these legislative choices are not at issue in determining whether the Legislature has usurped a judicial power which may not be conferred under this section. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Limitation on Power of Legislature to Alter Judicial Result. - The doctrine of separation of powers precludes the legislature from enacting a statute which alters a result obtained by final judicial decision before the date of the statute's enactment. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).
Presumption of Propriety in Official Acts. - There is a rebuttable presumption that an administrative agency has properly performed its official duties; while arbitrary and capricious agency action is itself prohibited by federal and state due process, any assertion of arbitrary agency action does not necessarily require the agency's action be reviewed for compliance with every other requirement under the State and federal Constitutions. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
This section does not prohibit the legislature from conferring the power on administrative agencies to assess civil penalties. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Agencies Are Not Courts. - Administrative agencies referred to in this section ex vi termini are distinguished from courts. They are not constituent parts of the General Court of Justice. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 142 S.E.2d 8 (1965), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as amended in 1962.
Even though superior court's order of consecutive sentencing was contrary to law, the Department of Corrections could not alter that order by refusing to change defendant's records to reflect concurrent sentencing without violating the separation of powers doctrine under N.C. Const. art. I, § 6; the order was entered under the superior court's exclusive, original jurisdiction over all criminal actions under G.S. 7A-271(a), and was therefore a voidable, not a void, judgment, and the Department, as a part of the executive branch, was bound to honor the judgment until it was corrected or vacated. State v. Ellis, 167 N.C. App. 276, 605 S.E.2d 168 (2004), rev'd 361 N.C. 200, 639 S.E.2d 425 (2007) (remanded to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea).
A police officer is not an administrative agency within the meaning of this section. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as amended in 1962.
Attempted grant to the Commissioner of Insurance of judicial power to impose a penalty upon an insurance agent for a violation of the insurance laws, varying in the Commissioner's discretion from a nominal sum to $25,000, violated this section, there being no reasonable necessity for conferring such judicial power upon the Commissioner. State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as amended in 1962.
Civil Penalty Power Was Necessary to Accomplish Agency's Purpose. - This section contemplates that discretionary judicial authority may be granted to an agency when reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency's purposes; civil penalty power was reasonably necessary to the purposes for which North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (NRCD) (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) was established. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
This section does not prohibit the legislature from conferring on administrative agencies the power to exercise discretion in determining civil penalties within an authorized range, provided that adequate guiding standards accompany that discretion. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Assessment of Civil Penalties Must Be Reasonably Necessary. - Administrative agencies are not constitutionally barred from assessing civil penalties. All administrative civil penalties are not per se in violation of the State Constitution, rather, the granting of the judicial power to assess a civil penalty must be "reasonably necessary" to the purposes for which the agency was created and with appropriate guidelines for the exercise of the discretion. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987).
Assessment of Penalty Held Constitutional. - The authority of the Private Protective Services Board under subsection (c) of G.S. 74C-17 to assess a civil penalty of up to two thousand dollars ($2,000) in lieu of revocation or suspension of a license is not an unconstitutional attempt to confer a judicial power on a state agency; the provision authorizing civil penalties is reasonably necessary to the Board in fulfilling its duties to require that those who hold themselves out as providing private protective services to citizens must meet high standards of training and professionalism. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd. v. Gray, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987).
This section did not prohibit the legislature from conferring on the North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (NRCD) (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) the power to exercise discretion in determining civil penalties within an authorized range; plenary guiding standards existed to check the exercise of NRCD discretion in its assessment of civil penalties in varying amounts, commensurate with the seriousness of the violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Assessment of Penalty Held Unconstitutional. - Where the DMV assessed a penalty for operating a vehicle on the highways with a gross weight in excess of that allowed under the license obtained pursuant to G.S. 20-96, but not in excess of the maximum axle weight limits, and such penalty was not authorized by G.S. 20-118, such penalty violated N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 1 and this section since there was no reasonable necessity for conferring absolute judicial discretion in the DMV. Young's Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 77 N.C. App. 180, 334 S.E.2d 419 (1985), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 202, 341 S.E.2d 574 (1986), decided prior to the 1985 amendment to G.S. 20-96.
The Department of Natural Resources and Community Development's (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) assessment of a civil penalty under G.S. 113A-64 arose from an unconstitutional transfer of judicial power under this section, which required the penalty be vacated. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572, supersedeas allowed on reconsideration, 323 N.C. 625, 374 S.E.2d 873 (1988).
Undergraduate Court's powers are not derivative of the North Carolina judiciary system nor are they limited by the safeguards protecting a citizen in the state court system; thus, the undergraduate court could not be categorized as a "court" and the proceedings are not required to be open to the public. DTH Publishing Corp. v. University of N.C. 128 N.C. App. 534, 496 S.E.2d 8 (1998), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 496, 510 S.E.2d 382 (1998).
Division of Motor Vehicle's Action Violated Separation of Powers Doctrine. - North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles violated the separation of powers clause in the North Carolina Constitution and violated a driver's right to due process when it unilaterally voided a district court ordered limited driving privilege to a driver; furthermore, by allowing the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to, in essence, invalidate a properly entered court order, G.S. 20-179.3(k), it violated the provisions requiring separation of powers contained in N.C. Const. art. I, § 6; N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1; and N.C. Const. art. IV, § 3. State v. Bowes, 159 N.C. App. 18, 583 S.E.2d 294 (2003), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 156, 592 S.E.2d 698 (2004).
Applied in Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Lanier, 16 N.C. App. 381, 192 S.E.2d 57 (1972).
Cited in Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993); Mullins v. North Carolina Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 125 N.C. App. 339, 481 S.E.2d 297 (1997); Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998).
Opinions of Attorney General
Delay of Rules by Review Commission. - An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, 60 N.C.A.G. 70 (February 25, 1991).