(1) Removal of Judges by the General Assembly. Any Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice may be removed from office for mental or physical incapacity by joint resolution of two-thirds of all the members of each house of the General Assembly. Any Justice or Judge against whom the General Assembly may be about to proceed shall receive notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least 20 days before the day on which either house of the General Assembly shall act thereon. Removal from office by the General Assembly for any other cause shall be by impeachment.
(2) Additional method of removal of Judges. The General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in addition to impeachment and address set forth in this section, for the removal of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for mental or physical incapacity interfering with the performance of his duties which is, or is likely to become, permanent, and for the censure and removal of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
(3) Removal of Magistrates. The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the removal of Magistrates for misconduct or mental or physical incapacity.
(4) Removal of Clerks. Any Clerk of the Superior Court may be removed from office for misconduct or mental or physical incapacity by the senior regular resident Superior Court Judge serving the county. Any Clerk against whom proceedings are instituted shall receive written notice of the charges against him at least 10 days before the hearing upon the charges. Any Clerk so removed from office shall be entitled to an appeal as provided by law.
(1971, c. 560, s. 1.)
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. IV, § 15, Const. 1868, as that article was rewritten in 1962.
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina," see 4 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1981).
CASE NOTES
Subsection (1) Provides Only for Removal from Office. - When a justice or judge is removed for incapacity, subsection (1) of this section imposes no sanction other than removal from office. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Purpose of Subsection (2). - The purpose of subsection (2) of this section is not so much to change the consequences of removal as it is to provide a "procedure in addition to impeachment and address" which will accomplish the goals which formerly could be accomplished only through the cumbersome and antiquated machinery of impeachment. It neither specifies a tribunal nor directs the creation of an authority for this purpose. It merely commands the legislature, in its discretion, to provide a new remedy as an adjunct to the cumbersome, ancient and impractical remedy of impeachment. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Recognizing the need for a method of removal better than impeachment or address, the General Assembly, following the lead of many of the states, submitted subsection (2) as a constitutional amendment authorizing an additional method of removal of judges. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
The mischief to be cured by subsection (2) of this section was the inefficiency of removal proceedings under the impeachment and address provisions of the Constitution, not the remedies. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Subsection (2) of this section must be read in connection with the impeachment provisions of this Article, which it was intended to supplement. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Conferral of Original Jurisdiction over Removal of Judges On Supreme Court. - Ratification of the amendment adding subsection (2) of this section carried with it an expression of the will of the people that the Constitution be amended so as to empower the legislature to confer upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over the censure and removal of judges. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
While subsection (2) of this section, which is a positive mandate to the legislature to provide a procedure in addition to impeachment for the removal and censure of judges and justices, does not expressly authorize the legislature to confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over the censure and removal of judges, by clear implication it grants to the legislature authority to confer such jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
Disqualification for Causes Other than Disability Authorized. - Subsection (2) of this section authorizes the General Assembly to disqualify from holding further judicial office a justice or judge who has been removed for causes other than mental or physical disability. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2859, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
Codes of judicial conduct may usefully be consulted to give meaning to the constitutional standards. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
When Conduct Is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice. - Whether the conduct of a judge may be characterized as prejudicial to the administration of justice and bringing the judicial office into disrepute depends not so much upon the judge's motives but more on the conduct itself, the results thereof and the impact such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
Personal Benefit Irrelevant. - Whether a judge receives any personal benefit from his conduct is wholly irrelevant to an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
The fact that a judge received no personal benefit, financial or otherwise, from his conduct does not preclude his conduct from being prejudicial to the administration of justice and bringing the judicial office into disrepute. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
Disposition of cases for reasons other than an honest appraisal of the facts and the law, as disclosed by the evidence presented, will amount to conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice whenever and however it may be defined or whoever does the defining. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
Judge's execution judgments, allowing limited driving privileges under § 20-179 upon a mere ex parte request without making any effort or conducting any inquiry to ascertain whether the facts recited in the judgments were true and whether he was lawfully entitled to enter the judgments, and without giving the State an opportunity to be heard, when in truth the judgments were supported neither in fact nor in law and were beyond the judge's jurisdiction to enter, constituted a gross abuse of important provisions of the motor vehicle statutes and amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
Article 30 of Chapter 7A (G.S. 7A-375 et seq.) Is Constitutional. - In view of the constitutional mandate in subsection (2) of this section that the General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure for the censure and removal of judges in addition to impeachment and address as provided in subsection (1), respondent's contention that the General Assembly, in enacting Article 30 of Chapter 7A (G.S. 7A-375 et seq.), abrogated its legislative duties by unconstitutionally delegating them to the Judicial Standards Commission, a creature of the General Assembly, was without merit. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
Article 30 of Chapter 7A (G.S. 7A-375 et seq.) is not unconstitutional because enacted in advance of the ratification of this section, since the General Assembly has the power to enact a statute not authorized by the present Constitution where the statute is passed in anticipation of an amendment authorizing it or provides that it shall take effect upon the adoption of such an amendment. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
The Judicial Standards Commission Act, Chapter 7A, Article 30 (G.S. 7A-375 et seq.) is constitutional and, under that Article, the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction to act in a case involving the removal from office of a judge. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
And Supreme Court Action Pursuant to such Authority Does Not Violate Constitution. - By accepting and acting upon the original jurisdiction authorized by the people under subsection (2) of this section and conferred by the legislature, the Supreme Court does not usurp power constitutionally reserved to another branch of government. Thus, the exercise of such jurisdiction does not violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978).
Grounds for suspension or removal of a magistrate are the same as for a judge of the General Court of Justice. In re Kiser, 126 N.C. App. 206, 484 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
Magistrate properly removed from office for engaging in willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute where he aided and abetted a minor in the possession of alcohol. In re Kiser, 126 N.C. App. 206, 484 S.E.2d 441 (1997).
Applied in In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976).
Cited in In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 233 S.E.2d 562 (1977); In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Greer, 58 N.C. App. 703, 294 S.E.2d 745 (1982); In re Doe, 329 N.C. 743, 407 S.E.2d 798 (1991).