The judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Section 3 of this Article, be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General Court of Justice. The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this Article.
Cross References. - As to the judicial department, see G.S. 7A-1 et seq.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. IV, § 1, Const. 1868, as that article was rewritten in 1962.
Legal Periodicals. - For comment on court reform under the 1962 amendment to Art. IV of the Constitution of 1868, see 42 N.C.L. Rev. 858 (1964).
For note on judicial review and separation of powers, see 45 N.C.L. Rev. 467 (1967).
For note analyzing possible constitutional barriers to judicial abrogation of contractual governmental immunity, see 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1082 (1976).
For survey of 1980 law on civil procedure, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1067 (1981).
CASE NOTES
Judicial Power Vested in General Court of Justice. - The primary purpose of the 1962 amendment, which rewrote Art. IV of the Constitution of 1868, was to establish "a unified judicial system." To accomplish this result, all judicial power, except that vested in a court for the trial of impeachments and in administrative agencies, is now vested by the Constitution in the General Court of Justice. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1962.
The judicial power of this state is "vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments and a General Court of Justice," and the latter constitutes "a unified judicial system for purposes of jurisdiction, operation, and administration," and includes a Superior Court Division. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).
Limitation on Power of General Assembly to Establish Courts. - The last clause of the former section, providing that the General Assembly shall have no power to "establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this article," was entirely new with the 1962 amendment to Art. IV of the Constitution of 1868. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1962.
The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).
Reconciliation with Need for Administrative Expertise. - A major purpose of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3, is to reconcile the retention of judicial power in the judicial branch required by this section, with the recognized need to utilize administrative expertise in implementing complicated regulatory schemes such as the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
Limitation on Power of Legislature to Alter Judicial Result. - The doctrine of separation of powers precludes the legislature from enacting a statute which alters a result obtained by a final judicial decision before the date of the statute's enactment. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).
Constitution Shields Judicial Branch from Legislative Interference So Far as Its Inherent Rights and Powers. - Pursuant to N.C. Const. art. I, § 6 and N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1, the North Carolina Constitution shields the judicial branch from legislative interference, so far at least as its inherent rights and powers are concerned. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
The inherent power of the Supreme Court has not been limited by the Constitution; on the contrary, the Constitution protects such power. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).
The existence of inherent judicial power is not dependent upon legislative action; the General Assembly has recognized the existence of the inherent power of the court and cannot abridge that power. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).
When the jurisdiction of a particular court is constitutionally defined, the legislature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless authorized to do so by the Constitution. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
The principle that when the jurisdiction of a particular court is constitutionally defined the legislature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless authorized to do so by the Constitution is grounded on the separation of powers provisions found in many American Constitutions, including the Constitution of this State. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976); Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).
A legislative declaration may not be given effect so as to alter or amend a final exercise of the courts' rightful jurisdiction. Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).
The General Assembly has no authority to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).
The General Assembly is without authority to expand the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond the limits set in the Constitution. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over claims against the State, and the General Assembly has no authority to confer such jurisdiction upon it. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
Appeal to Supreme Court from Administrative Decisions. - The General Assembly has no authority to provide for appeal from decisions of administrative agencies to the Supreme Court without prior appeal to and review by a lower court within the General Court of Justice. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
General Assembly May Not Confer Judicial Power on Police Officer. - A police officer is neither an official of the General Court of Justice, nor an administrative agency within the meaning of Art. IV, § 3, Const. 1868; hence the General Assembly lacks constitutional authority to confer judicial power upon a police officer. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1962.
Former G.S. 160-20.1 and Session Laws 1963, c. 1093, purporting to confer judicial powers on police "desk officers" who were not officers of the General Court of Justice and who were not vested with judicial power on November 6, 1962, were unconstitutional and void. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1962.
Thus Police Officer May Not Authorize Issuance of Warrant. - The General Assembly cannot confer upon a police officer judicial power sufficient to authorize the issuance of a valid warrant under any circumstances, even where the complainant is a private citizen and has no connection with any law-enforcement agency. State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967), decided under former Art. IV, Const. 1868, as rewritten in 1962.
Judicial Review of Acts of General Assembly. - The courts of this State have no inherent power to review acts of the General Assembly and to declare invalid those which the courts disapprove, or, upon their own initiative, find to be in conflict with the Constitution. Green v. Eure, 27 N.C. App. 605, 220 S.E.2d 102 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 297, 222 S.E.2d 696 (1976).
While plaintiffs could not obtain judicial review under G.S. 150A-43 (now G.S. 150B-43) of their claim that G.S. 143B-350(f)(8), conferring on the State Board of Transportation the power and duty to approve all highway construction programs, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the board, since the claim involves no agency "decision", such claim could be heard pursuant to this section. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).
Three-Judge Panel for Redistricting Challenges Does Not Infringe on Chief Justice's Authority. - Three-judge panel of superior court judges required by G.S. 1-267.1 is not a new court outside of the contemplation of N.C. Const. art. IV, §§ 12 and 13(2), as a challenge to redistricting is a matter of procedure that lies within the purview of the General Assembly; accordingly, no new courts are created beyond those contemplated by N.C. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 2. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 358 N.C. 219, 595 S.E.2d 112 (2004).
Judicial Power to Require Officials to Act in Compliance with Duties. - The courts of this State have the power, pursuant to this section, to issue in personam orders requiring public officials to act in compliance with their ministerial or nondiscretionary public duties. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).
In Personam Orders. - By virtue of their being "a co-ordinate department of the government," courts of this state are empowered "to issue in personam orders requiring public officials to act in compliance with their . . . public duties." In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).
Judicial Functions in Criminal Cases. - The functions of the court in regard to the punishment of crimes are to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and, if that determination be one of guilt, then to pronounce the punishment or penalty prescribed by law. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971).
Grant of Discretionary Parole Power. - Former G.S. 148-62, insofar as it granted discretionary power to the Board of Paroles (now the Parole Commission), was not an assignment of judicial power to the Board in contravention of this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 6. Jernigan v. State, 10 N.C. App. 562, 179 S.E.2d 788, aff'd, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971).
The granting of parole and the supervision of parolees are purely administrative functions, and accordingly may be entrusted by the legislature to nonjudicial agencies. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971).
The order of the Supreme Court establishing the Client Security Fund and requiring annual payments by attorneys to the fund was essential corollary to the court's function, was required for the proper administration of justice, and did not violate the Constitution. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).
Assessment of Penalty Held Unconstitutional. - Where the DMV assessed a penalty for operating a vehicle on the highways with a gross weight in excess of that allowed under the license obtained pursuant to G.S. 20-96, but not in excess of the maximum axle weight limits, and such penalty was not authorized by G.S. 20-118, such penalty violated this section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3, since there was no reasonable necessity for conferring absolute judicial discretion in the DMV. Young's Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 77 N.C. App. 180, 334 S.E.2d 419 (1985), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 202, 341 S.E.2d 574 (1986), decided prior to the 1985 amendment to G.S. 20-96.
Undergraduate Court's powers are not derivative of the North Carolina judiciary system nor are they limited by the safeguards protecting a citizen in the state court system; thus, the undergraduate court could not be categorized as a "court" and the proceedings are not required to be open to the public. DTH Publishing Corp. v. University of N.C. 128 N.C. App. 534, 496 S.E.2d 8 (1998), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 496, 510 S.E.2d 382 (1998).
Indigent Defense Services Act and the Office of Indigent Defense Services violated the state constitution's separation of powers principles; appointing and compensating attorneys for indigent criminals was not committed to any one state government branch. Ivarsson v. Office of Indigent Def. Servs., 156 N.C. App. 628, 577 S.E.2d 650 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 250, 582 S.E.2d 269 (2003).
Division of Motor Vehicle's Action Violated Separation of Powers Doctrine. - North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles violated the separation of powers clause in the North Carolina Constitution and violated a driver's right to due process when it unilaterally voided a district court ordered limited driving privilege to a driver; furthermore, by allowing the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to, in essence, invalidate a properly entered court order, G.S. 20-179.3(k), it violated the provisions requiring separation of powers contained in N.C. Const. art. I, § 6; N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1; and N.C. Const. art. IV, § 3. State v. Bowes, 159 N.C. App. 18, 583 S.E.2d 294 (2003), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 156, 592 S.E.2d 698 (2004).
Applied in Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980); Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983).
Cited in Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Lanier, 16 N.C. App. 381, 192 S.E.2d 57 (1972); In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978); Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164 (1978); In re Watts, 38 N.C. App. 90, 247 S.E.2d 427 (1978); In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 255 S.E.2d 142 (1979); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982); In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989); In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997); Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998); In re Will of Buck, 350 N.C. 612, 516 S.E.2d 858 (1999); In re Azalea Garden Bd. & Care, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 45, 535 S.E.2d 388 (2000).
Opinions of Attorney General
Delay of Rules by Review Commission. - An act vesting in the Administrative Rules Review Commission (ARRC), a commission appointed by the General Assembly, the power to delay indefinitely the effective date of duly adopted agency rules which it deems in excess of statutory authority would likely be held to violate this section by vesting the ARRC with judicial powers reserved to the court and with supreme legislative powers reserved to the General Assembly. See opinion of Attorney General to Henson P. Barnes, President Pro Tempore, Senate, 60 N.C.A.G. 70 (1991).