(1) Residence. The Governor shall reside at the seat of government of this State.
(2) Information to General Assembly. The Governor shall from time to time give the General Assembly information of the affairs of the State and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall deem expedient.
(3) Budget. The Governor shall prepare and recommend to the General Assembly a comprehensive budget of the anticipated revenue and proposed expenditures of the State for the ensuing fiscal period. The budget as enacted by the General Assembly shall be administered by the Governor.
The total expenditures of the State for the fiscal period covered by the budget shall not exceed the total of receipts during that fiscal period and the surplus remaining in the State Treasury at the beginning of the period. To insure that the State does not incur a deficit for any fiscal period, the Governor shall continually survey the collection of the revenue and shall effect the necessary economies in State expenditures, after first making adequate provision for the prompt payment of the principal of and interest on bonds and notes of the State according to their terms, whenever he determines that receipts during the fiscal period, when added to any surplus remaining in the State Treasury at the beginning of the period, will not be sufficient to meet budgeted expenditures. This section shall not be construed to impair the power of the State to issue its bonds and notes within the limitations imposed in Article V of this Constitution, nor to impair the obligation of bonds and notes of the State now outstanding or issued hereafter.
(4) Execution of laws. The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
(5) Commander in Chief. The Governor shall be Commander in Chief of the military forces of the State except when they shall be called into the service of the United States.
(6) Clemency. The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses (except in cases of impeachment), upon such conditions as he may think proper, subject to regulations prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons. The terms reprieves, commutations, and pardons shall not include paroles.
(7) Extra sessions. The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, by and with the advice of the Council of State, convene the General Assembly in extra session by his proclamation, stating therein the purpose or purposes for which they are thus convened.
(8) Appointments. The Governor shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators appoint all officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.
(9) Information. The Governor may at any time require information in writing from the head of any administrative department or agency upon any subject relating to the duties of his office.
(10) Administrative reorganization. The General Assembly shall prescribe the functions, powers, and duties of the administrative departments and agencies of the State and may alter them from time to time, but the Governor may make such changes in the allocation of offices and agencies and in the allocation of those functions, powers, and duties as he considers necessary for efficient administration. If those changes affect existing law, they shall be set forth in executive orders, which shall be submitted to the General Assembly not later than the sixtieth calendar day of its session, and shall become effective and shall have the force of law upon adjournment sine die of the session, unless specifically disapproved by resolution of either house of the General Assembly or specifically modified by joint resolution of both houses of the General Assembly.
(11) Reconvened sessions. The Governor shall, when required by Section 22 of Article II of this Constitution, reconvene a session of the General Assembly. At such reconvened session, the General Assembly may only consider such bills as were returned by the Governor to that reconvened session for reconsideration. Such reconvened session shall begin on a date set by the Governor, but no later than 40 days after the General Assembly adjourned:
(a) For more than 30 days jointly as provided under Section 20 of Article II of this Constitution; or
(b) Sine die. If the date of reconvening the session occurs after the expiration of the terms of office of the members of the General Assembly, then the members serving for the reconvened session shall be the members for the succeeding term.
(1969, c. 932, s. 1; 1977, c. 690, s. 1; 1995, c. 5, s. 2.)
History Note. - The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 5, Const. 1868.
The provisions of subsections (4) and (9) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 7, Const. 1868.
The provisions of subsection (5) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 8, Const. 1868.
The provisions of subsection (6) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 6, Const. 1868, as amended in 1872 - 1873 and 1954.
The provisions of subsection (7) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 9, Const. 1868.
The provisions of subsection (8) of this section are similar to those of Art. III, § 10, Const. 1868, as amended by the Convention of 1875.
Editor's Note. - The amendments to this section by Session Laws 1995, c. 5, s. 2, were submitted to the qualified voters at the general election held in November, 1996, and were approved at that election. Session Laws 1995, c. 5, s. 4, made this section effective January 1, 1997 upon certification; certification was made on November 26, 1996.
Legal Periodicals. - For article on punishment for crime in North Carolina, see 17 N.C.L. Rev. 205 (1939).
For a discussion of the Governor's power to appoint officers, see section in article entitled "A Study in Separation of Powers: Executive Power in North Carolina," 77 N.C.L. Rev. 2049 (1999).
For comment, "The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in Federalism," see 82 N.C.L. Rev. 1195 (2004).
CASE NOTES
Editor's Note. - Many of the cases cited below were decided under corresponding provisions of the Constitution of 1868.
Duty of Governor to Execute Laws. - The Governor, as the constituted head of the executive department, is charged with the duty of seeing that legislative acts are carried into effect. Winslow v. Morton, 118 N.C. 486, 24 S.E. 417 (1896).
Construction. - Because the North Carolina Public Records Law was enacted pursuant to the state's general policy that the people may obtain copies of their public records and public information free or at minimal cost unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and nothing in the Public Records Law refers to or specifically pertains to either pardons or clemency, it is not a law relative to the manner of applying for pardons under N.C. Const., Art. III, § 5(6). News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Easley, - N.C. App. - , 641 S.E.2d 698 (2007).
An expenditure under subsection (3) occurs only when funds are disbursed. Boneno v. State, 54 N.C. App. 690, 284 S.E.2d 170 (1981).
The incurring of a contractual obligation does not constitute an expenditure within the meaning of subsection (3). Boneno v. State, 54 N.C. App. 690, 284 S.E.2d 170 (1981).
Budget Process. - The Constitution mandates a three-step process with respect to the State's budget: (1) this section directs that the "Governor shall prepare and recommend to the General Assembly a comprehensive budget . . . for the ensuing fiscal period"; (2) N.C. Const., Art. II, vests in the General Assembly the power to enact a budget (one recommended by the Governor or one of its own making); and (3) after the General Assembly enacts a budget, this section then provides that the Governor shall administer the budget "as enacted by the General Assembly." In re Powers, 295 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. 1982).
N.C. Const. Art. III, § 5 details the duties of the Governor, requiring that he balance the budget. State Employees Ass'n of N.C. Inc. v. State, 154 N.C. App. 207, 573 S.E.2d 525 (2002).
Pardons Exclusive Prerogative of Governor. - After a defendant has begun the service of his term, or at least when that takes place after the adjournment of the court, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the judge to alter the sentence or interfere with it in any way, as the power of pardon, parole or discharge during the term of imprisonment is by this section the exclusive prerogative of the Governor. State v. Lewis, 226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E.2d 691 (1946), decided before the 1954 amendment to Art. III, § 6, Const., 1868, which amendment terminated the Governor's power of parole.
Power of General Assembly to Pass Amnesty Act. - The power, granted by this section, to exercise clemency after conviction in some particular case and in favor of an individual especially charged with an offense is an executive act of a quasi-judicial kind, and does not conflict with or exclude the power of the General Assembly to pass an amnesty act in abolition or oblivion of the offense. State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 59 S.E. 74, 122 Am. St. R. 464 (1907).
The Governor does not possess the constitutional power to parole. State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 488 S.E.2d 188 (1997).
Conditional Pardon. - The Governor may grant a pardon upon a condition precedent that the prisoner pay costs of trial, and upon condition subsequent, that he remain of good character, and be sober and industrious. In re Williams, 149 N.C. 436, 63 S.E. 108, 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 238 (1908).
Pardon While Appeal Pending. - The term "conviction" in this section denotes a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury; therefore, when defendant, after verdict and judgment in the court below, appealed to the Supreme Court and, pending such appeal, was pardoned by the Governor, such pardon was authorized by this section and was valid. State v. Alexander, 76 N.C. 231 (1877); State v. Mathis, 109 N.C. 815, 13 S.E. 917 (1891).
Commutation of Sentence. - The exercise by the Governor of his judgment, resulting in the commutation of the sentence of one man convicted of murder or rape and the refusal to commute the sentence of another convicted of such crime, cannot be called "freakish" or "arbitrary" merely because another governor might, theoretically, have reached opposite conclusions. State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S. Ct. 3205, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1206 (1976).
Sentence Active in Part and Suspended in Part. - It is not within the power of a court to impose a sentence active in part and suspended in part. Where a single offense is involved, the sentence must be made active in full or suspended in full. A split sentence is in effect an anticipatory pardon or parole, violative of the provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina appertaining to pardons and paroles. In re Powell, 241 N.C. 288, 84 S.E.2d 906 (1954).
Power of Appointment. - The Governor has the power to appoint an officer of the State with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators, unless there is some other provision for the appointment. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
Power of Appointment Under Constitution of 1868 - In General. - Construing Art. III, § 10, Const. 1868, corresponding to subsection (8) of this section, which prior to 1875 authorized the Governor to appoint "all officers whose offices are established by this Constitution, which shall be created by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for," and prohibited the General Assembly from appointing or electing such officers, along with cognate sections of the Constitution of 1868, in reference to vacancies, etc., prior to 1875, it was held in various decisions that the term, "unless otherwise provided for" meant unless otherwise provided for by the Constitution itself, and that, except in specified and restricted instances, the legislature had no power to appoint to office or to fill vacancies therein. State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 59 (1872); People ex rel. Nichols v. McKee, 68 N.C. 429 (1873); People ex rel. Welker v. Bledsoe, 68 N.C. 457 (1873). And see Trustees of Univ. of N.C. v. McIver, 72 N.C. 76 (1875).
Article III, § 10, Const. 1868, as it then existed, and others of kindred nature, were altered by the Convention of 1875, which removed the express prohibition and the express grant of power to the Governor restricted to "all officers whose offices are established by this Constitution and whose offices are not otherwise provided for." And it became the accepted view that, in all offices created by statute, including the directorates of State institutions, the power of appointment, either original or to fill vacancies, was subject to legislative provision as expressed in a valid enactment. See State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 83 S.E. 354 (1914); Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C. 638, 33 S.E. 138 (1899); State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 33 S.E. 136 (1899).
Same - Filling Vacancy and Appointing for Regular Term Distinguished. - The Governor never nominates to the Senate to fill vacancies. He does that alone, in all cases. But where officers have to be appointed to fill a regular term, then he nominates to the Senate, unless it be an officer who is elected by the people, and then he never nominates to the Senate, but fills the vacancy or term by his own appointment (unless there is an officer holding over), until the people can elect. People ex rel. Battle v. McIver, 68 N.C. 467 (1873), decided under Art. III, § 10, Const. 1868, prior to the 1875 amendment.
Same - Appointment by Governor Limited to Constitutional Officers. - The inherent right of the Governor to appoint was restricted to constitutional offices and to where the Constitution of 1868 itself so provided. State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 83 S.E. 354 (1914).
Same - Power of Legislature to Fill Statutory Offices. - The Convention of 1875 intended to alter the Constitution as interpreted in People ex rel. Nichols v. Mckee, 68 N.C. 429 (1873), and to confer upon the General Assembly the power to fill offices created by statute. State Prison v. Day, 124 N.C. 362, 32 S.E. 748 (1899), citing Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 21 S.E. 787 (1895). See also Osborne v. Town of Canton, 219 N.C. 139, 13 S.E.2d 265 (1941).
Same - Transfer of Duties of Office. - While the General Assembly has the power to abolish an office created by legislative authority, it cannot by mere transfer to others of the duties, connected with an institution, necessary and useful to the public, to be exercised by them, oust the incumbent from an office belonging to him under a contract with the State. State Prison v. Day, 124 N.C. 362, 32 S.E. 748 (1899).
Appointment by Chief Justice of Supreme Court. - It is not a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Constitution for the General Assembly to provide that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. App. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
Use of Pardoned Crime to Enhance or Sentence Improper. - The reasoning that an increased punishment for a current offense due to a prior pardoned conviction is not punishment for the prior pardoned offense is a legal fiction that conflicts with logic and the administrative duties of the governor; thus, trial court infringed upon the prerogatives of the governor by finding that defendant's prior conviction constituted an aggravating factor. State v. Clifton, 125 N.C. App. 471, 481 S.E.2d 393 (1997), cert. granted, 346 N.C. 182, 486 S.E.2d 200 (1997), discretionary review improvidently allowed, 347 N.C. 391, 493 S.E.2d 56 (1997).
Clemency Power may not be Delegated. - As the exercise of the clemency power was the "exclusive prerogative" of the governor and could not be delegated, under the Rule of Necessity, even if a death row inmate's Woodard claims were cognizable by a court, the governor remained fully able to consider and resolve the inmate's clemency request. Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 549 S.E.2d 840 (2001).
Public Release of Clemency Records. - Subject matter jurisdiction existed over the question of whether the Governor was required to release certain records relating to applications for clemency pursuant to the North Carolina Public Records Law because resolving the relevant issues required the court to exercise its fundamental responsibility to determine the proper meaning of N.C. Const., Art. III, § 5(6); the case did not raise a political question by requiring the court to intrude upon the Governor's clemency powers, but only required the court to identify where to draw the line between the Executive Branch and the Legislature with respect to clemency, given the separation of powers doctrine. News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Easley, - N.C. App. - , 641 S.E.2d 698 (2007).
In resolving a dispute as to whether certain records pertaining to clemency were subject to the North Carolina Public Records Law, the court noted that neither G.S. 147-16(a)(1) nor G.S. 147-21 included any provision specifying whether the records involved in the statutes were considered public records; thus, the court was unable to determine that the General Assembly, in exercising its constitutional authority under N.C. Const., Art. III, § 5(6), intended to provide that the application process for pardons was subject to the Public Records Law. News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Easley, - N.C. App. - , 641 S.E.2d 698 (2007).
Power to Prevent a Deficit. - Governor's order directing the revenue secretary to halt expenditures for capital improvements, further reduce expenditures throughout state agencies, and withhold funds appropriated to local governments was authorized by N.C. Const., Art. III, § 5(3) to prevent a deficit, and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine; further N.C. Const., Art. V, § 5, which was directed at the general assembly, did not conflict with N.C. Const., Art. III, § 5. County of Cabarrus v. Tolson, 169 N.C. App. 636, 610 S.E.2d 443 (2005).
Applied in State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975).
Cited in Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1971); Jernigan v. State, 10 N.C. App. 562, 179 S.E.2d 788 (1971); State v. Vert, 39 N.C. App. 26, 249 S.E.2d 476 (1978); In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 255 S.E.2d 142 (1979).