A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. I, § 29, Const. 1868.
Legal Periodicals. - For an essay, "On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1803 (1992).
For article, "The Rising Tide of North Carolina Constitutional Protection in the New Millenium," see 27 Campbell L. Rev. 223 (2005).
CASE NOTES
Liberal Construction. - The Constitution must be construed in the light of its history, and must be liberally construed in aid of progress, but a liberal construction is especially required in interpreting those provisions safeguarding individual liberty. State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854, 128 A.L.R. 658 (1940), decided under Art. I, § 29, Const. 1868.
Sovereign Immunity. - Sovereign immunity was not available as a defense to the claims of temporary employees that were brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution against state agencies and employees. Sanders v. State Pers. Comm'n, - N.C. App. - , 644 S.E.2d 10 (2007).
Exhaustion of Other State Remedies Required. - A state constitutional action is not proper under this section, unless no other state remedy is available; here, an existing state tort remedy precluded plaintiff's assault-based constitutional claim against an arresting officer. Glenn-Robinson v. Acker, 140 N.C. App. 606, 538 S.E.2d 601 (2000).
Relation to Declaratory Judgment Actions. - Although the North Carolina Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, G.S. 1-253 to 1-267, empowers a trial court to decline a request for declaratory relief under certain circumstances, G.S. 1-257 should not be applied to thwart a properly presented constitutional challenge; the North Carolina courts are obligated to protect fundamental rights when those rights are threatened and the North Carolina Constitution admonishes that a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty. Therefore, where it clearly appears either that property or fundamental human rights are denied in violation of constitutional guarantees, and where a statutory provision is specifically challenged by a person directly affected by it, declaratory relief as to the constitutional validity of that provision is appropriate; in other words, when the requested declaration satisfies the recognized criteria, the trial court has no discretion to decline the request. Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 573 S.E.2d 125 (2002).
For application of Art. I, § 29, Const. 1868, see State v. Hardy, 189 N.C. 799, 128 S.E. 152 (1925).
Cited in Corum v. University of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, reh'g denied, 331 N.C. 558, 418 S.E.2d 664, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 113 S. Ct. 493, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971); In re Reddy, 16 N.C. App. 520, 192 S.E.2d 621 (1972); Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975); State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985); Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986); Corum v. University of N.C. 97 N.C. App. 527, 389 S.E.2d 596 (1990); Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 111 N.C. App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993); In re Allison, 143 N.C. App. 586, 547 S.E.2d 169 (2001); Seaton v. Owens, - F. Supp. 2d - (M.D.N.C. Dec. 8, 2003).