In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable.
Cross References. - As to jury trials and waiver of same in civil cases, see G.S. 1A-1, Rules 38 and 39.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of the first sentence of Art. I, § 19, Const. 1868, as amended in 1946.
Legal Periodicals. - As to less than unanimous jury verdicts in civil cases, see 27 N.C.L. Rev. 539 (1949).
For note on the power of the court to increase a jury award by additur, see 37 N.C.L. Rev. 169 (1959).
For case law survey as to indictment and trial by jury, see 45 N.C.L. Rev. 878 (1967).
For note on directed verdicts in favor of the party with the burden of proof, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 607 (1980).
For survey of 1981 constitutional law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1272 (1982).
CASE NOTES
I. In General.
II. Specific Proceedings.
I. IN GENERAL.
Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former Art. I, § 19, Const. 1868, before and after its amendment in 1946.
This Section Applicable to Actions Respecting Property Only. - Though this section contains no such qualifications, it has been construed to apply only to actions respecting property in which the right to a jury trial existed either at common law, or by statute before the 1868 Constitution became operative; for actions created since then, the right to a jury trial depends upon statutory authority. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 91 N.C. App. 517, 372 S.E.2d 312 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989).
Cap on Punitive Damages. - Section 1D-25, which places a cap on punitive damages, does not violate injured parties' rights to a jury trial, because their right to punitive damages is not a property interest, and they only have a right to a civil jury trial concerning property. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 562 S.E.2d 82 (2002), aff'd, 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
Although N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 appears to embody a broad definition of the term ""property," a controversy in which punitive damages are assessed is not one which enforces a plaintiff's legal rights and, therefore, does not respect property; thus, G.S. 1D-25 in no way infringes upon plaintiffs' right to a trial by jury under N.C. Const. art. 1, § 25. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
Section Compared to N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13. - There is not a conflict between this section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13, but Art. IV, § 13 is more comprehensive. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), overruled in part, Jacobs v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. App. 441, 528 S.E.2d 905 (2000).
This section and N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13 must be read in conjunction with one another. N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 13 merely establishes the form and procedure for the trial of all civil actions, including the procedure of having issues of fact decided by a jury in what were formerly equity proceedings; to determine whether there exists a constitutional right to trial by jury of a particular cause of action, one looks to this section, which ensures that there is a right to trial by jury where the underlying cause of action existed at the time of adoption of the 1868 Constitution, regardless of whether the action was formerly a proceeding in equity. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).
"Jury". - The word "jury" is to be given the signification which it had when the Constitution was adopted, i.e., a body of 12 men in a court of justice duly selected and impaneled in the case to be tried. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944), decided prior to the 1946 amendment to Art. I, § 19, Const. 1868, which amendment provided that no person should be excluded from jury service on account of sex.
"Trial". - The word "trial" refers to a dispute and issue of fact, and the expression "trial by jury," as used in this section, does not necessarily signify that every legal controversy is to be determined by a jury. Board of County Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921).
Similarity to Art. I, § 19, Const. 1868. - The provisions of this section are similar to the provisions of the first sentence of Art. I, § 19 of the Constitution of 1868. In re Annexation Ordinance, 284 N.C. 442, 202 S.E.2d 143 (1974).
For examination of historical development of the right to trial by jury, see Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).
The ancient mode of trial by jury has been preserved in the present Constitution. Chesson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 223 N.C. 378, 26 S.E.2d 904 (1943).
History teaches that a jury can best settle factual controversies, and for that reason jury trials ought to remain sacred and inviolable. Mangum v. Yow, 263 N.C. 525, 139 S.E.2d 537 (1965).
Right to Jury Trial Is Guaranteed. - The Constitution of North Carolina guarantees to every litigant the sacred and inviolable right to demand a trial by jury of the issues of fact arising in all controversies respecting property, and he cannot be deprived of this right except by his own consent. Scott Poultry Co. v. Bryan Oil Co., 272 N.C. 16, 157 S.E.2d 693 (1967); Mathias v. Brumsey, 27 N.C. App. 558, 219 S.E.2d 646 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 140, 220 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
This section guarantees to every person the "sacred and inviolable" right to demand a jury trial of issues of fact arising in all controversies at law respecting property. Sykes v. Belk, 278 N.C. 106, 179 S.E.2d 439 (1971).
This section has been construed to guarantee trial by jury in all civil actions where the parties have not waived the right. Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
But Only in Certain Cases. - This constitutional provision applies only to cases in which the prerogative existed at common law or by statute at the time the Constitution of 1868 was adopted. Chowan & S.R.R. v. Parker, 105 N.C. 246, 11 S.E. 328 (1890); Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921); Belk's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Guilford County, 222 N.C. 441, 23 S.E.2d 897 (1943); Kaperonis v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 260 N.C. 587, 133 S.E.2d 464 (1963); In re Estate of Wallace, 267 N.C. 204, 147 S.E.2d 922 (1966); In re Northwestern Bonding Co., 16 N.C. App. 272, 192 S.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 282 N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 837 (1972); In re Taylor, 25 N.C. App. 642, 215 S.E.2d 789 (1975); In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust, 46 N.C. App. 654, 266 S.E.2d 686 (1980); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982).
The right to a trial by jury as provided in this section applies only to cases in which the prerogative existed at common law or was procured by statute at the time the Constitution was adopted, and not to those in which the right and the remedy are thereafter created by statute. Thus, this section cannot be invoked to deprive a public official of the discretion with which he is clothed by legislative enactment. Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921); McInnish v. Board of Educ., 187 N.C. 494, 122 S.E. 182 (1924).
The right to trial by jury as provided for by this section applies only to cases in which the prerogative existed at common law or was procured by statute at the time the Constitution was adopted. The right does not apply to cases in which a right and remedy were thereafter created by statute. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).
The relevant date for determining the scope of the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases is the date of adoption of the 1868 Constitution. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982); State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).
Right Not Absolute. - Constitutional right to a jury trial preserved in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 53(b)(2) was not absolute, as the right was premised upon a preliminary determination by the trial judge that there indeed existed genuine issues of fact and credibility which required submission to the jury, and, in certain cases, credibility was manifest as a matter of law, but no general rule could be stated to determine whether credibility was manifest in a particular case. Dockery v. Hocutt, 357 N.C. 210, 581 S.E.2d 431 (2003).
Trial court did not err in denying the one child's request for a jury trial on the one child's motion for sanctions against the second child and wife regarding the counterclaim that they filed; the motion for sanctions was not an action regarding a property right, and thus the one child did not have a constitutional right to a jury, and in any event the evidence did not support the entry of sanctions. Hill v. Hill, 181 N.C. App. 69, 638 S.E.2d 601 (2007), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 361 N.C. 427, 648 S.E.2d 502, 503.
Right Applies Only in Cases Involving Fact Issues. - This section does not confer the right to demand the intervention of a jury absolutely and unqualifiedly, but only in cases involving issues of fact. McQueen v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 111 N.C. 509, 16 S.E. 270 (1892).
The constitutional right to trial by jury is not absolute; rather, it is premised upon a preliminary determination by the trial judge that there indeed exist genuine issues of fact and credibility which require submission to the jury. Therefore, the right to jury trial is not an impediment to directing a verdict for that party with the burden of proof where the credibility of the movant's evidence is manifest as a matter of law. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 256 S.E.2d 388 (1979).
In Actions Where Legal Rights Are Involved. - The right to trial by jury applies exclusively to actions in which legal rights are involved. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Great S. Trucking Co., 223 N.C. 687, 28 S.E.2d 201 (1943) (concurring opinion).
The credibility of testimony is for the jury, not the court, and a genuine issue of fact must be tried by a jury unless this right is waived. Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
Summary judgment may not be granted in favor of the party having the burden of proof when his right to recover depends upon the credibility of his witnesses. Shearin v. National Indem. Co., 27 N.C. App. 88, 218 S.E.2d 207 (1975).
Jury Trial Not Required at Each Stage of Proceedings. - This section, guaranteeing the right of trial by jury in "controversies at law respecting property," includes equitable and legal elements involved in the determination of the issues made by the pleadings, but it is not required that a trial by jury be had at each stage of the proceedings when this right has elsewhere therein been properly safeguarded by statute. Board of County Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921).
Court May Not Determine Fact Issues. - Right to a jury trial is guaranteed by this section, and where the parties do not consent to trial by the court, the court may not determine, prior to the introduction of evidence, an issue of fact joined by the pleadings. Hershey Corp. v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 207 N.C. 122, 176 S.E. 265 (1934).
It was error for the trial court to determine issues of fact raised by the pleadings in the absence of waiver of the constitutional and statutory right to a trial by jury, there being no question of reference. Sparks v. Sparks, 232 N.C. 492, 61 S.E.2d 356 (1950).
Where there was nothing in the record to indicate that petitioner and respondent had waived their constitutional and statutory right to have issue of fact joined on the pleadings tried by a jury, and there was no question of reference, the judge had no authority to enter an order affirming the order of the assistant clerk of the superior court, which in effect was a determination by the judge of the issue of fact raised by the pleadings and a finding by him that money deposited in the office of the clerk of the superior court was funds belonging to decedent and an order that said money be distributed to the administrator c.t.a. of her last will and testament. In re Estate of Wallace, 267 N.C. 204, 147 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
Nor Enter Judgment Without Aid of Jury on Issues of Fact. - Where the parties to a civil action do not waive trial by jury nor consent that the judge find the facts, it is error for the judge to enter judgment without the aid of the jury on the controverted issues of fact raised by the pleadings. Icenhour v. Bowman, 233 N.C. 434, 64 S.E.2d 428 (1951).
When Judgment of Dismissal Offends Plaintiff's Right to Jury Trial. - Judgment of dismissal of plaintiff's action offends against plaintiff's constitutional right of jury trial where these factors come into focus: (1) The record discloses no stipulation by which jury trial was waived or consent was given for the court to find facts; (2) the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case in accordance with the allegations of the complaint; (3) the defendant offered no evidence; (4) the plaintiff's evidence does not establish the truth of the defendant's affirmative defense. Ingle v. McCurry, 243 N.C. 65, 89 S.E.2d 745 (1955).
Where there is more than a scintilla of evidence to sustain the allegations of the complaint, the case must be submitted to the jury, its sufficiency to warrant a verdict for plaintiff being for the determination of the jury, subject only to the discretionary power of the trial court to set the verdict aside in proper cases, and a strict adherence to this rule is necessary to preserve the right of trial by jury guaranteed under this section. Fox v. Asheville Army Store, Inc., 215 N.C. 187, 1 S.E.2d 550 (1939).
Burden of Proof Between the Parties. - The rules of law as to the burden of proof between the parties to litigation respecting damages to property resulting from negligence is one of substantial right guaranteed by the federal Constitution, and more emphatically by this section of the State Constitution. McDowell v. Norfolk S.R.R., 186 N.C. 571, 120 S.E. 205, 42 A.L.R. 857 (1923).
Power of Court to Increase Jury Award by Additur. - While it may be suggested that the practice of additur deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a jury trial, guaranteed by this section, the obvious answer is that the defendant may waive that right, which he does when he consents to pay the additur, since in this State the parties to a civil action have a right to waive a jury trial. Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
Compulsory Reference. - Every litigant has the constitutional right of trial by jury unless he voluntarily waives it, and, in case of a compulsory reference made to facilitate the trial of a cause, he may renew his demand for a jury trial by excepting to the report of the referee and pointing out the findings so excepted to as a basis for issues. State ex rel. Wilson v. Featherstone, 120 N.C. 446, 27 S.E. 124 (1897).
A compulsory reference, under former G.S. 1-189, did not deprive either party of his constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of fact arising on the pleadings, but such trial was only upon the written evidence taken before the referee. Resort Dev. Co. v. Phillips, 278 N.C. 69, 178 S.E.2d 813 (1971).
Although when a court orders a compulsory reference, a party preserves his right to trial by complying with the procedural steps outlined in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 53, the party is entitled to trial by jury only if the evidence before the reference was sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Fauchette v. Zimmerman, 79 N.C. App. 265, 338 S.E.2d 804 (1986).
Admission of hearsay evidence does not violate the confrontation clause when declarant is unavailable to testify and his statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. Thus, in a trial for taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old child, admission of evidence admissible under established exception to the hearsay rule did not violate defendant's right of confrontation under this section. State v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139 (1988).
Polling Jury in Civil Actions. - Under this section, the losing party in a civil action may demand a polling of the jury upon the return of the verdict, as a matter of right. Culbreth v. Borden Mfg. Co., 189 N.C. 208, 126 S.E. 419 (1925).
Upon the coming in of the verdict in a civil action, either party to the action has the constitutional right to have the jury polled before accepting the verdict as a unanimous one. In re Will of Sugg, 194 N.C. 638, 140 S.E. 604 (1927).
Waiver of Right to Jury Trial Strictly Construed. - It is a general rule, since the right of trial by jury is highly favored, that waivers of the right are always strictly construed and are not to be lightly inferred or extended by implication, whether with respect to a civil or criminal case. Mathias v. Brumsey, 27 N.C. App. 558, 219 S.E.2d 646 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 140, 220 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
And Will Not Be Presumed. - There can be no presumption of a waiver of trial by jury where such a trial is provided for by law. Thus, in the absence of an express agreement or consent, a waiver of the right to a jury trial will not be presumed or inferred. Indeed, every reasonable presumption should be made against waiver. Mathias v. Brumsey, 27 N.C. App. 558, 219 S.E.2d 646 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 140, 220 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
How Jury Trial May Be Waived. - A party may waive his right to jury trial by (1) failing to appear at the trial, (2) written consent filed with the clerk, (3) oral consent entered in the minutes of the court, (4) failing to demand a jury trial pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 38(b). Sykes v. Belk, 278 N.C. 106, 179 S.E.2d 439 (1971).
There is no constitutional impediment to arbitration agreements. Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 118 N.C. App. 412, 455 S.E.2d 678 (1995).
An agreement to arbitrate a dispute is not an unenforceable contract requiring waiver of a jury; thus, the trial court erred in concluding that because arbitration provision did not provide for trial of facts by a jury that it was unconscionable and unenforceable under G.S. 22B-10, and in violation of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 18 and 25. Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 118 N.C. App. 412, 455 S.E.2d 678 (1995).
Applied in Brondum v. Cox, 30 N.C. App. 35, 226 S.E.2d 193 (1976); Brondum v. Cox, 292 N.C. 192, 232 S.E.2d 687 (1977); Huyck Corp. v. C.C. Mangum, Inc., 309 N.C. 788, 309 S.E.2d 183 (1983); Williams & Michael, P.A. v. Kennamer, 71 N.C. App. 215, 321 S.E.2d 514 (1984); Jackson v. Lundy Packing Co., 72 N.C. App. 337, 324 S.E.2d 290 (1985); Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985); In re McCarroll, 313 N.C. 315, 327 S.E.2d 880 (1985).
Cited in Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Branch v. Branch, 282 N.C. 133, 191 S.E.2d 671 (1972); Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D.N.C. 1978); Fogleman v. Fogleman, 41 N.C. App. 597, 255 S.E.2d 269 (1979); Dowat, Inc. v. Tiffany Corp., 83 N.C. App. 207, 349 S.E.2d 610 (1986); Ragan v. County of Alamance, 98 N.C. App. 636, 391 S.E.2d 825 (1990); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004); State v. Price, - N.C. App. - , 611 S.E.2d 891 (2005).
II. SPECIFIC PROCEEDINGS.
Party Charged with Maintaining Nuisance Has Right to Jury Trial. - A party charged with the maintenance of a public nuisance has a right to traverse the factual allegations of the complaint. If he does so, he cannot be deprived of his right to a jury trial on the issues raised by the pleadings. State ex rel. Bowman v. Malloy, 264 N.C. 396, 141 S.E.2d 796 (1965).
Damage Cases. - In an action for damages for negligently setting fire to plaintiff's woods by sparks from defendant's engine, it was held that this section guaranteed, as a "sacred and inviolable" right, that the plaintiff might have the case submitted to the jury. Williams v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 140 N.C. 623, 53 S.E. 448 (1906).
Arbitration. - Arbitration judgment was not void as a violation of an injured party's right to jury trial under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 38 and 39, N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 or U.S. Const. amend. VII, because her right to a jury trial was protected by N.C. R. Arb. 5(a), which allowed any party to have a trial de novo upon written demand filed within 30 days of the arbitrator's award. Clendening v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 20, 2002).
Under Workers' Compensation Act, trial by jury is not a constitutional right. Hagler v. Mecklenburg Hwy. Comm'n, 200 N.C. 733, 158 S.E. 383 (1931).
Injunction Action Under CAMA and Dredge and Fill Act. - Trial court erred in granting defendant's demand for a jury trial in state-initiated proceeding seeking mandatory injunctive relief under Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) and the Dredge and Fill Act for the removal of fill material on defendant's property; an action such as this neither existed at common law nor by statute at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1868; therefore, this section did not apply. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989).
Actions Under ERISA. - Preemptive effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., does not abridge the right to a jury trial under this section in an action to recover benefits due under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App. 602, 381 S.E.2d 330 (1989).
The right to a jury trial under the law of this State does not conflict with any of the substantive provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act; therefore, State law would control and plaintiff was entitled to have factual controversy in his action for benefits due under an insurance contract submitted to a jury. Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App. 602, 381 S.E.2d 330 (1989).
Eminent Domain Proceeding Is Not Controversy Concerning Property. - A proceeding to assess damages for the taking of land by eminent domain is not a controversy concerning property within the meaning of this section. Kaperonis v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 260 N.C. 587, 133 S.E.2d 464 (1963).
Since Ownership Is Not in Issue in Eminent Domain. - This section is a constitutional guaranty of jury trial when the issue determinative of the rights of the litigants is: "Who owns the land, plaintiff or defendant?" This issue does not arise when the State, or its agency, exercises the power of eminent domain. The phrase "eminent domain" by definition admits condemnor did not own, but took or appropriated the property of another for a public purpose. Wescott v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 262 N.C. 522, 138 S.E.2d 133 (1964).
Provisions Establishing Conditions for Jury Trial in Small Claims Court. - The provisions of Session Laws 1951, c. 1057, setting up the procedure for adjudicating small claims in the Superior Court of Forsyth County, to the effect that no jury trial shall be had in an action instituted pursuant thereto, unless a demand is made therefor in the manner set out in the act, and the costs advanced and the prosecution bond filed as required therein, were not unreasonable provisions and did not violate this section. Better Home Furn. Co. v. Baron, 243 N.C. 502, 91 S.E.2d 236 (1956).
Proceedings for Alimony, etc. - When in proceedings for alimony without divorce the pleadings raise the issues of the validity of marriage between the parties, or whether the husband had separated himself from the wife and failed to provide her suitable or reasonable sustenance, or whether the husband is a drunkard or spendthrift under former G.S. 50-16, the right of trial by jury arises to the defendant, and the case should be transferred by the judge to the civil issue docket for the purpose. Crews v. Crews, 175 N.C. 168, 95 S.E. 149 (1918).
Provisions of former G.S. 50-16, empowering the court to allow subsistence and counsel fees pendente lite to plaintiff in an action for alimony without divorce, did not violate this section. Peele v. Peele, 216 N.C. 298, 4 S.E.2d 616 (1939).
Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights. - The North Carolina constitutional requirement of trial by jury is not applicable to a proceeding for termination of parental rights. In re Ferguson, 50 N.C. App. 681, 274 S.E.2d 879 (1981).
Equitable Distribution Action. - No right to bring an action for equitable distribution of marital property existed prior to the adoption of the equitable distribution statutes, G.S. 50-20 and G.S. 50-21, and the language of the statutes themselves create no new right to trial by jury; therefore, there is no right to trial by jury for such an action under the Constitution of North Carolina. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989).
The Date of Separation in the Context of Equitable Distribution - In the context of equitable distribution, defendant does not have a right to jury trial on the issue of the date of separation when he seeks a divorce from bed and board. No such constitutional right exists nor has the legislature statutorily provided for such a right when it drafted the equitable distribution statutes although the date of separation is a jury-triable issue within the absolute divorce context. McCall v. McCall, 138 N.C. App. 706, 531 S.E.2d 894 (2000).
Appraisal. - Plaintiff 's right under the North Carolina Constitution to trial by jury was not abridged by the appraisal clause. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
Notwithstanding this provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly approved appraisal as a means of settling the single issue of amount of loss sustained by an insured. Bentley v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 107 N.C. App. 1, 418 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
Condemnation. - Where a matter was called for hearing pursuant to G.S. 136-108 in a condemnation action with no jury, this hearing did not infringe upon the landowner's right to a jury trial as provided by the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. DOT v. Wolfe, 116 N.C. App. 655, 449 S.E.2d 11 (1994).
Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings. - This State has never had a statute which expressly conferred upon an attorney the right to a trial by jury in a judicial disciplinary or disbarment proceeding. Since no such right existed at common law, or by statute at the time the State Constitution was adopted, and is not now provided for by statute, an attorney's motion for a trial by jury is properly denied. In re Northwestern Bonding Co., 16 N.C. App. 272, 192 S.E.2d 33, appeal dismissed, 282 N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 837 (1972).
The legislature in 1969 had absolutely no intention of providing a constitutional right to jury trial for attorneys in disciplinary proceedings when it submitted this section to the people. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982).
No Right to Jury Trial In Action to Determine Attorneys' Fees Under Quantum Meruit - Trial court did not err in denying a law firm's request for a jury trial on the reasonable value of the attorneys who had provided legal services for a client under a contingency fee agreement and who were then discharged by the client under N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 and N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13; until adoption of the modern rule, clients had no right to unilaterally discharge an attorney and force him to pursue a quantum meruit claim, and the right to a jury trial under N.C. Const. art. I, § 25 was guaranteed only in cases in which the right and the remedy were in existence when the North Carolina Constitution of 1868 was adopted. Guess v. Parrott, 160 N.C. App. 325, 585 S.E.2d 464 (2003).
Shareholder's Derivative Actions. - Although a litigant's right to have a jury try issues of fact concerning the merits of the action initiated by the filing of a derivative suit complaint is guaranteed by the Constitution of North Carolina, the procedure required by former G.S. 55-55(c) did not exist before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, and therefore no State constitutional right exists to a trial by jury of factual issues that might arise during the course of the proceedings required under this section. Alford v. Shaw, 327 N.C. 526, 398 S.E.2d 445 (1990).
No Right to Jury Trial Under Coastal Area Management Act. - In an action brought by State seeking preliminary injunction to require removal of sign and compliance with Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA), sign company was not entitled to trial by jury since it had not asserted "right and remedy" existing when State Constitution was adopted and since CAMA did not provide statutory right to jury trial. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Givens, 101 N.C. App. 695, 400 S.E.2d 745 (1991).
Proceedings before the judge to remove a prosecuting attorney from office for willful misconduct or maladministration in office do not require an issue to be submitted to the jury, as such office is not a property right under the provisions of this section. State ex rel. Hyatt v. Hamme, 180 N.C. 684, 104 S.E. 174 (1920).
Revocation of Driver's License. - Since an action to revoke a driver's license is a civil action, jury trial is not necessary. State v. Carlisle, 20 N.C. App. 358, 201 S.E.2d 704 (1973), aff'd, 285 N.C. 229, 204 S.E.2d 15 (1974).
Section 18B-504 does not preserve the right to trial by jury. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).
Neither § 90-112 nor § 90-112.1 creates a right to trial by jury. State v. Morris, 103 N.C. App. 246, 405 S.E.2d 351 (1991).
An action under § 90-112.1 is in the nature of an action for replevin and is in essence a civil action; as such, the right to a jury trial, if any, is governed by this section of the Constitution, and thus, defendant was not entitled to a trial by jury for her remission action. State v. Honaker, 111 N.C. App. 216, 431 S.E.2d 869 (1993).
Insanity Proceedings. - The right to trial by jury did not exist at common law in insanity proceedings and is thus not required under this section. In re Taylor, 25 N.C. App. 642, 215 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
Taxes. - The right to trial by jury guaranteed by this section does not apply to matters concerned with the administration of the tax laws and the machinery for the collection of taxes, unless the statute affords express authority for this method of determining questions of fact. State ex rel. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. J.M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E.2d 4 (1941).
This section does not require court review of the valuation of land for taxation, or determination of such value by a jury in a de novo hearing, and will not support resort to certiorari for that purpose. Belk's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Guilford County, 222 N.C. 441, 23 S.E.2d 897 (1943).
As to controversies between Board of Education and county commissioners, see Board of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs, 182 N.C. 571, 109 S.E. 630 (1921), citing Board of Educ. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 N.C. 469, 93 S.E. 1001 (1917).