All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.
History Note. - The provisions of this section are similar to those of Art. I, § 26, Const. 1868, as amended in 1946.
Legal Periodicals. - For case law survey as to freedom of religion, see 45 N.C.L. Rev. 862 (1967).
For comment, "The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation to Deregulation," see 1980 Duke L.J. 801.
For note on state regulation of public solicitation for religious purposes, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 996 (1980).
For note, "Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1302 (1986).
For article, "The Concept of Religion in State Constitutions," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 437 (1986).
For note, "Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes," see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 1271 (1995).
CASE NOTES
Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former Art. I, § 26, Const. 1868, as amended in 1946.
G.S. 105-278.6A, (formerly G.S. 105-275(32)(v) is unconstitutional as violative of the prohibition against the establishment of religion as found in both this section and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it distinguishes between homes that are religiously affiliated and those that perform essentially the same functions but lack any religious affiliation. In re Springmoor, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 184, 479 S.E.2d 795 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 1, 498 S.E.2d 177 (1998).
Standing. - Non-profit corporation which ran a retirement community for the aged, sick, and infirm, and which sought a personal property tax exemption on certain items owned by it and used in the operation of the home, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of G.S. 105-278.6A, (formerly G.S. 105-275(32)). In re Springmoor, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 184, 479 S.E.2d 795 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 1, 498 S.E.2d 177 (1998).
Secular Neutrality Mandated. - Construed together, this section and N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19 and U.S. Const., Amend. I may be said to coalesce into a singular guarantee of freedom of religious profession and worship, as well as an equally firmly established separation of church and state. The legislature oversteps the bounds of this separation when it enacts a regulatory scheme which, whether in purpose, substantive effect, or administrative procedure, tends to "control or interfere" with religious affairs, or to "discriminate" along religious lines, or to constitute a law "respecting" the establishment of religion. Stated simply, the constitutional mandate is one of secular neutrality toward religion. Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
This Section Protects Freedom to Exercise One's Religion. - The term "rights of conscience," as used in this section, must be construed in relation to the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience. Consequently, the freedom protected by this provision is no more extensive than the freedom to exercise one's religion, which is protected by U.S. Const., Amend. I. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
But It Does Not Protect One's Sense of Ethics. - This constitutional provision does not provide immunity for every act which one's conscience permits him to do, or even for every act which one's conscience classifies as required by ethics, nor shield the defendant from a command by the State that he do an act merely because he believes it morally or ethically wrong. It is the right to exercise one's religion, or lack of it, which is protected, not one's sense of ethics. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
Protection Not Limited to Clergymen and Organized Religious Groups. - The freedoms protected by this constitutional provision are not limited to clergymen. Indeed, they are not limited to members of an organized religious body, and consequently are not contingent upon proof that others share the views of the individual who asserts his own constitutional right to the freedom to exercise his religion or "right of conscience." In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
Unorthodox Religious Beliefs Are Protected. - This constitutional provision extends its protection to the unorthodox, unusual and unreasonable belief as truly as to the belief shared by many. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
But freedom to exercise one's religious beliefs is not absolute. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
And use of drugs may be prohibited notwithstanding the user's asserted belief that such use is required by Divine Law. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
Religious Freedom Is Impaired by Governmental Compulsion of That Which Religious Belief Forbids. - The free exercise of religion is impaired not only by the governmental prohibition of that which one's religious belief demands, but also by governmental compulsion of that which one's religious belief forbids. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
And Government May Not Force One to Act Contrary to Religious Belief in Absence of "Compelling State Interest". - The liberty secured by U.S. Const., Amend. I and by this section is so basic and fundamental that one may not be compelled by governmental action to do that which is contrary to his religious belief in the absence of a "compelling State interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate." In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
Effective operation of courts of justice is a "compelling State interest." In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
And It Overrides Belief of Witness Who Refuses to Testify for Religious Reasons. - The "compelling interest" of the State in the rendering of a just judgment in accordance with its law overrides the incidental infringement upon the religious belief of a witness that for him to testify is wrong. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
The State has a compelling interest that a person called as a witness should be sworn and should testify in the administration of justice between the State and one charged with a serious offense, and therefore a minister called as a witness in such prosecution may be held in contempt of court upon his refusal to be sworn as a witness, notwithstanding his assertion that his refusal is a matter of religious conscience. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918, 87 S. Ct. 2137, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1362 (1967).
Counsel may not attack credibility of a witness because of the witness's religious beliefs or rights of conscience. State v. James, 322 N.C. 320, 367 S.E.2d 669 (1988).
Prosecutor's argument as to defendant's credibility held not to violate this section or G.S. 8C-1, Rules 603 or 610, despite an indirect reference to defendant's affirmation as a witness. State v. James, 322 N.C. 320, 367 S.E.2d 669 (1988).
The legal tribunals of the State have no jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical questions and controversies, for there is a constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious profession and worship, as well as an equally firmly established separation of church and State, but the courts do have jurisdiction as to civil, contract and property rights which are involved in, or arise from, a church controversy. Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954); Atkins v. Walker, 19 N.C. App. 119, 198 S.E.2d 101, aff'd, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973); African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church v. Union Chapel A.M.E. Zion Church, 64 N.C. App. 391, 308 S.E.2d 73 (1983), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 649 (1984).
Civil Court's Jurisdiction Over Church's Termination of Members. - While a court did not have jurisdiction to consider ecclesiastical matters in a church's governance of its membership, such as whether the grounds in a termination letter to two church members were accurate and whether the termination was conducted in a fair and reasonable manner and in good faith, the two terminated members had a property interest in their membership, and the court could consider whether the church's bylaws were properly adopted and followed by the church in the termination of the members. Tubiolo v. Abundant Life Church, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 324, 605 S.E.2d 161 (2004), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 126 S. Ct. 350, 163 L. Ed. 2d 59 (2005).
How Civil Courts Must Decide Church Property Disputes. - Civil courts must decide church property disputes without inquiring into underlying controversies over religious doctrines and without in any way basing their decisions upon any determination made upon such an inquiry. Atkins v. Walker, 19 N.C. App. 119, 198 S.E.2d 101, aff'd, 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
Appellate court erred in dismissing the pastor's appeal of the trial court's denial of the pastor's motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought against the pastor, secretary, and board chairman over whether they were diverting church funds because no neutral principles of law existed to resolve the church members' claims that the pastor, secretary, and board chairman were making improper use of the funds, the courts had to defer to the church's internal governing body, the Council for Ministry, to avoid becoming impermissibly entangled in the dispute, in violation of the First Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 643 S.E.2d 566 (2007).
In a child custody proceeding, the court cannot base its findings on the preferability of any particular faith or religious instruction. Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d 470 (1977).
But the spiritual welfare of a child is a factor that may be considered by the trial court in making a custody determination. Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d 470 (1977).
Biological Parents' Rights Outweighed Adoptive Parents' Rights. - Biological parents constitutionally-protected paramount right to custody, care, and control of their child, including control over his associations, outweighed adoptive parents' interests, including their right to freedom of religion; therefore, inquiry into plaintiffs' religious beliefs, if error, was harmless. Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
A law requiring the observance of Sunday as a day of rest and relaxation does not cease to be a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State, merely because it is in harmony with the religious beliefs of most Christian denominations. Raleigh Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 276 N.C. 661, 174 S.E.2d 542 (1970).
The choice of Sunday by the legislature as a day of rest and relaxation does not render statute unconstitutional, as a law establishing a religion or interfering with freedom of worship, merely because other persons are required by their religious convictions to rest from their labors on a different day of the week, or because, having no religious convictions, they consider Sunday as an exceptionally promising day for business. Raleigh Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 276 N.C. 661, 174 S.E.2d 542 (1970).
The provisions of this section do not deprive the legislature of authority to prohibit by a statute, otherwise valid, the carrying on of and engaging in, on Sunday, any and all labor and the operation of industrial and commercial pursuits, except for works of necessity and acts which, themselves, are in exercise of the constitutional right to worship. Moreover, the legislature may delegate this power to municipalities. Raleigh Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 276 N.C. 661, 174 S.E.2d 542 (1970).
Ordinance prohibiting certain activities on Sunday held not in contravention of this section. State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802, 74 S. Ct. 50, 98 L. Ed. 334, reh'g denied, 346 U.S. 918, 74 S. Ct. 272, 98 L. Ed. 413 (1953).
A municipal ordinance prohibiting the handling of venomous and poisonous reptiles in such a manner as to endanger the public health, safety and welfare would not be held invalid upon defendants' contention that the ordinance interfered with the exercise of their religious practices. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S. Ct. 813, 93 L. Ed. 1099, reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 971, 69 S. Ct. 939, 93 L. Ed. 1121 (1949).
Injunction Against Former Pastor. - Judgment by default final restraining defendant, whom a majority of the members of a church had voted not to employ as its pastor after the year 1959, from appearing at the church after the year 1959 and acting or attempting to act as its pastor at a religious service or at any other church meeting, so long as he was not its pastor, violated no rights guaranteed to him by N.C. Const., Art. I. Collins v. Simms, 254 N.C. 148, 118 S.E.2d 402 (1961). See also, Collins v. Simms, 257 N.C. 1, 125 S.E.2d 298 (1962).
Applied in Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979).
Cited in Royal v. State, 153 N.C. App. 495, 570 S.E.2d 738 (2002).
Opinions of Attorney General
An educational program in which clergymen are trained at the expense of the State in total health care counseling in order to offer free counseling services in their communities does not violate either U.S. Const., Amend. I or this section. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Patrick Guyton, Community Development Specialist, Department of Human Resources, 43 N.C.A.G. 189 (1973).